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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Victor Brudney* 
Abstract: This Article examines the constitutionality of regulating com-
mercial speech. Keeping in mind traditional First Amendment values, this 
Article squares the regulation of commercial speech with the justifications 
that accompany the regulation of noncommercial speech. After providing 
a definition of commercial speech, this Article inspects the First Amend-
ment values that have been applied to commercial speech. This Article 
explains why commercial speech is different from other types of speech 
and further explains how these differences have led to inconsistent 
“autonomy” concerns regarding the First Amendment coverage of com-
mercial speech. This Article argues that autonomy concerns of speakers 
and listeners are not enough alone to justify First Amendment protection 
for commercial speech, but there are certain occasions when commercial 
speech may warrant First Amendment protection. The context of com-
mercial speech is paramount to the First Amendment analysis. This Arti-
cle explains how the context of commercial speech affects this analysis, 
specifically focusing on expression engaging matters of self-government 
or public policy and expression engaging in other matters of societal im-
port. 
Introduction 
 Because not all expression is included in the speech whose free-
dom the First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging,1 the 
constitutionality of regulation of commercial speech turns, in fair part, 
on whether and why that speech is determined to be “covered” by the 
First Amendment—and if covered, how extensively or vigorously the 
freedom to speak is, or should be, “protected” against abridgement 
(compared with other varieties of covered speech).2 
                                                                                                                      
 
* © 2012, Victor Brudney, Robert B. and Candice J. Hass Professor in Corporate Fi-
nance Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School. 
1 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
2 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment 
Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 23 (suggesting that “some speech acts . . . lie 
wholly outside the coverage of the First Amendment”); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries 
of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 
1765, 1769 (2004) (elucidating the distinction between the “coverage” and the “protec-
tion” of the First Amendment); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play 
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 Commercial speech differs from speech specially protected under 
the First Amendment because commercial speech is less likely to be 
confronted by counter or corrective speech, or “more speech,” which is 
an essential predicate for the protection of speech by the First 
Amendment. Assessing the constitutionality of regulation of commer-
cial speech in light of underlying First Amendment values requires a 
definition of commercial speech. 
I. Framing the Question 
A. Defining Commercial Speech 
 The uncertain content of the commercial speech that is subject to 
government regulation, and the lack of clarity of U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions addressing the restraints imposed by the First Amendment on 
such regulation, has generated considerable discussion of the unavoid-
able ambiguity of the concept of commercial speech3 and some inco-
                                                                                                                      
 
in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265, 281 (1981) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
commercial speech jurisprudence is premised on the questionable assumption that “all 
communication is covered” by the First Amendment and so one must “create areas of non-
coverage” to justify regulation of speech acts). But cf. Rodney Smolla, Information, Imagery, 
and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 
777, 780 (1993) (“Commercial speech, as speech, should presumptively enter the debate 
with full First Amendment protection.”). 
3 See generally C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989); C. 
Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1976); 
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., “The Uncharted Area” —Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 175 (1980); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance 
Speech and the First Amendment, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 163 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, Commercial 
Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 372 (1979); Daniel A. Farber & Philip 
P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1615 (1987); Charles 
G. Geyh, The Regulation of Speech Incident to the Sale or Promotion of Goods and Services: A Multi-
factor Approach, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of 
Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1990); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: 
Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children’s Television Programming, 45 Duke L.J. 1193 (1996); 
Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising: The Case for Public Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 Lewis 
& Clark L. Rev. 367 (2006); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1249 (1995); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial 
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 (1971) [hereinafter Re-
dish, First Amendment in the Marketplace]; Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, The Value of Free Speech]; Frederick Schauer, 
Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1181 (1988); 
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1212 (1983); Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Defi-
nition of Commercial Speech, 58 Md. L. Rev. 55 (1999); Jason A. Cade, Note, If the Shoe Fits: 
Kasky v. Nike and Whether Corporate Statements About Business Operations Should Be Deemed 
Commercial Speech, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 247 (2004); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical 
Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 359 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Note, First 
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herence in the Court’s efforts at delineation of it. In the bulk of the 
Court’s commercial speech cases, the regulation at issue seeks to avert 
harmful consequences to consumers from heeding communications 
made as part of an effort of a for-profit enterprise to induce purchase 
of specified commodities or services.4 
 Grounded in that effort, a workable concept of commercial speech 
may fairly be said to entail two sorts of expression. One is expression 
that may be called “narrow” commercial speech. It consists of a com-
munication that (1) proposes or offers explicitly or “implicitly”5 a sale 
or exchange transaction in a specified commodity or service, and is 
made by the proposer (or its agents) as part of its business of profiting 
from such transactions,6 and (2) does no more than describe the terms 
                                                                                                                      
 
Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 205 (1976). 
4 Some regulation of commercial speech rests on the government’s interest in protecting 
society (or individuals) against injury other than that from receiving and heeding the con-
tent of the sales message in the speech. Such regulation is not aimed at limiting the “persua-
siveness” of the speech or the recipient’s absorption of, and response to, its sales message—
that is, at encouraging or discouraging the sale. The regulation distinguishes between com-
mercial speech and other speech in prescribing methods of access or distribution, presuma-
bly because the regulation ascribes different values to the two categories of speech and to 
their respective social benefits. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 
410, 418 (1993) (striking down a “categorical prohibition on the use of news racks to dis-
seminate commercial messages”); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493 
(1981) (striking down a municipal ordinance “imposing substantial prohibitions on the erec-
tion of outdoor advertising displays”); cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 
301–02 (1974) (upholding a municipal ordinance barring political advertising on public 
transit). The target of the regulation is the method of distributing the speech and the costs it 
imposes on society—much like time, place, and manner regulation of speech otherwise cov-
ered by the First Amendment. Cf. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 
93 (1977) (striking down a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of residential “For 
Sale” and “Sold” signs and holding that such a restriction cannot be characterized as a per-
missible time, place, or manner regulation of speech). 
5 See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 n.10 (1979) (characterizing use of a trade 
name as an implicit “solicitation of patronage”). “Implicitly” is a flexible term that expands 
the notion of commercial speech to include selling efforts that do not expressly offer particu-
lar items or prices in the communication, without necessarily extending to ads or communi-
cations that mention only the seller’s name. That the boundary between implicit commercial 
speech and noncommercial speech may be sufficiently permeable to tempt the ingenuity of 
sellers and advertising agencies to invoke opaque formulae does not make it an unnecessary 
or “impractical” boundary. Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417–20 (2006) (articulating 
the boundaries of protected “public” speech by government employees). 
6 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495–97 (1996); Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). Excluded from commercial speech are 
communications by non-profit enterprises that only discuss products or services (and possi-
bly also non-profits that offer products for sale). Compare Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 
282, 284 (6th Cir. 1941) (upholding an FTC cease and desist order barring Perma-Maid, a 
1156 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1153 
of such proposal or simply identify the putative seller’s products.7 Not-
withstanding the Court’s contrary view,8 it is hard to find any plausible 
links between narrow commercial speech and expression that relates to 
matters “of import to significant issues of the day”9—at least linkage 
that is strong enough to support First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech.10 
                                                                                                                      
company that used steel food containers, from claiming that the aluminum food contain-
ers used by its competitors caused negative health effects), with Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 
124 F.2d 640, 641 (3d Cir. 1941) (dismissing an FTC cease and desist order and allowing 
Scientific Manufacturing, a public interest group, to continue spreading pamphlets ex-
plaining the dangers of aluminum because the company had no economic interest in the 
sale of aluminum). 
Commercial speech in the service of sales of “speech products,” otherwise covered by 
the First Amendment, such as books, theatrical performances, movies, musical perform-
ances, or art exhibitions, should, but might not, enjoy the protection to which the covered 
speech is entitled. Compare Bolger, 463 US at 64–68 (holding that a federal statute prohibit-
ing unsolicited mailing of contraceptive ads was unconstitutional), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 
421 U.S. 809, 818–21 (1975) (holding that a Virginia statute making it illegal to encourage 
an abortion was unconstitutional as applied to a newspaper editor advertising the exis-
tence of legal abortion facilities in New York), with Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 
641–45 (1951), abrogated by Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 
(1980) (holding that a city ordinance banning unsolicited door-to-door advertising was 
constitutional). 
7 This delineation modifies somewhat the classic formula: “speech which does ‘no 
more than propose a commercial transaction.’” Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 762 
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
385 (1973)). But, it is narrower than some of the suggestions in Supreme Court opinions, 
and broader than others. See Geyh, supra note 3, at 1 n.2. The narrow commercial com-
munication may, in addition to proposing a transaction, contain statements about the 
manner in which the seller’s products are produced and distributed, or about warranties 
and repairs, or about the identity or quality of distributors of products or services, or com-
pare the seller’s products or services with those of competitors with regard to price. More-
over, to propose a transaction, no specific item need be offered so long as the communica-
tion proposes or suggests some transaction involving the seller’s identified products or 
services. See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11 n.10; see also Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 
570 F.2d 157, 163 (7th Cir. 1977) (indicating that the Supreme Court’s expressions on the 
subject of commercial speech “were not intended to be narrowly limited to the mere pro-
posal of a particular commercial transaction”). 
8 Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 766–70. It is possible that the Court linked all 
commercial speech to matters of societal interest because of uncertainty as to how, and 
whether, courts would be able to draw lines identifying and separating commercial speech 
that might be of public interest. 
9 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977). 
10 See generally Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due 
Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1979) (arguing that governmental regula-
tion of commercial speech does not implicate effective self-government or individual self-
fulfillment through free expression, and therefore should not be vindicated under the 
First Amendment); Piety, supra note 3 (arguing that the commercial speech doctrine ex-
tended the scope of the First Amendment to areas outside of its original justifications). 
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 Much, if not the bulk of, commercial speech, however, is “en-
riched,” in that it does more than simply articulate the terms of the 
proposed transaction or describe the identified products or services. It 
contains additional expression, such as portrayals of the benefits and 
joys (personal or social) of owning or using the offered product or the 
pleasures of the attractive lifestyle it offers. Or it may promote the 
seller’s products or services by highlighting their health and safety 
benefits, or ego-enhancing features, or public policy benefits for soci-
ety.11 In short, it may contain expression that might be, or would be, 
covered by the First Amendment if it were freestanding. Attachment to 
an effort to sell an identified product or service is a necessary,12 but 
may not be a sufficient, condition for the expression to be commercial 
speech.13 The absence of a selling effort (explicit or implicit14) pre-
                                                                                                                      
 
11 See, e.g., Fur Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 
16, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1974). In the language of Citizens Con-
sumer Council, it may discuss or editorialize on “cultural, philosophical or political” matters 
or contain “generalized observations even about commercial matters.” 425 U.S. at 761. 
Such speech may (or may not) be commercial; its message may (or may not) be tied 
closely enough to a proposal to transact or its context may (or may not) suggest a sales 
proposal. 
12 The Court has characterized the “[proposal of] a commercial transaction” as “the 
test for identifying commercial speech.” Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989). 
The elusiveness of an adequate definition and coverage of the First Amendment is illus-
trated in the Court’s opinions in cases involving labor relations. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBar-
tolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575–76 (1988) 
(involving speech by organized workers urging customers to refrain from shopping at a 
mall in Florida); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 60 (1964) 
(involving speech by organized workers urging Safeway customers to refrain from buying 
Washington State apples); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531–32 (1945) (involving 
speech by labor organizers seeking to induce workers to form or join a union). 
13 It does not aid the analysis to discuss separately each of the characteristics that are said 
to be components of commercial speech, such as profit motive or advertising form, among 
others. Indeed, no single characteristic fits all cases treated as commercial speech, and some 
only fit noncommercial speech. The concept, as used in the decisions and for analytic pur-
poses, is a confluence of necessary conditions. There is room to debate whether any particu-
lar communication is attached to a sales effort. Compare Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 163 (hold-
ing that ads stating that eating eggs does not increase risk of heart disease was not protected 
by the First Amendment because these statements were made to induce customers to buy 
eggs), with In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 1988 WL 490114, at *3–6 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 1988) 
(reversing the agency’s initial decision and allowing a tobacco company to advertise a study 
questioning the health risks associated with smoking cigarettes, because the study was not 
designed to sell cigarettes). 
14 How closely “attached” any particular communication must be to a proposal of a 
commercial transaction in order for it to be commercial speech will vary with the context. 
Continuous trading on securities markets suggests that speech by publicly traded corpora-
tions and their executives (and speech by putative sellers) that will more or less systemati-
cally affect the prices of securities in the market should be characterized as commercial 
speech—even though no particular proposal to transact is made. Thus, the connection 
1158 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1153 
cludes the communication from being commercial speech, but need 
not imply that the speech is otherwise covered or protected by the First 
Amendment.15 The presence of such an effort may convert otherwise 
fully protected expression—whether of fact, opinion, or rumination— 
into commercial speech.16 
                                                                                                                      
 
with securities and, therefore, with the sale or purchase of securities, is close enough to 
bring the speech within the scope of the concept of commercial speech. Three examples 
of speech that has such a close connection are (1) the pricing information required by 
securities laws to be disclosed by a corporation that is issuing or purchasing its own securi-
ties, (2) periodic disclosures about the corporation’s affairs required by the securities laws, 
and (3) proxy materials. But cf. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 163–64 (arguing that 
First Amendment protection should attach to all proxy and non-proxy securities-related 
speech). Similarly, expression on the packaging of a product explaining its use or contents 
is part of the sales proposal. 
15 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985); 
Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 20–25 (2000). 
But cf. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 774–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that speech 
about commercial matters should be granted First Amendment protections because it is an 
important part of the public discourse). For example, the Northrop Corporation ads dis-
cussed by one scholar may have been enjoinable (to protect the judicial process) even 
though they may not have been “commercial.” McGowan, supra note 3, at 398; cf. United 
States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that speech, whether com-
mercial or not, will not be given First Amendment protection if it is intended to incite 
another to break the law). Nothing in the Court’s decisions (as distinguished from the 
language in its opinions) or in policy requires the concept of commercial speech to cover 
expression that is not part of a selling effort. Such expression may, or may not, be covered 
by the First Amendment, regardless of its “commercial” or “economic” import. Compare 
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1228--29 (arguing that current Supreme Court doctrine makes it 
impossible to distinguish between corporate speech that is political and corporate speech 
that is not deserving of free speech protection), with Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 
(holding that certain corporate speech is not deserving of free speech protection if it is 
“solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience”). 
As Professor Robert Post notes, some expression is properly treated as nonspeech, such 
as a marriage proposal, a private conversation among two or three persons about renting a 
home, or a physician’s advice to a patient. See Post, supra note 3, at 1272; see also Kent 
Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 57–59 (1989) (discussing “situa-
tion-altering utterances”). Is protection of such expression better found in some conception 
of “privacy,” and if so, how immune to regulatory interference is “privacy” and based on 
which constitutional provision or theory? See Fox, 492 U.S. at 481--86 (holding that the peti-
tioner’s claim that the university regulation at issue was overly broad and restricted private 
activities that should have free speech protection was not ripe for resolution). 
16 This analysis applies equally to communications by B, for example, if uttered on be-
half of A or at A’s request and expense, notwithstanding the fact that the speech is for-
mally created and uttered by B. In each case, the cost of the speech is borne by A, and its 
function is to stimulate its addressees to purchase A’s products for their personal benefit. 
That a communication also urges a public good (for the economy, for the public’s health, 
or for the nation’s well-being) does not preclude the communication from being “only” 
commercial speech, unless that message dominates the listener’s attention and incentive to 
make the purchase. Nonetheless, commercial speech may be entitled to First Amendment 
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 To be sure, virtually every public pronouncement by a seller of 
products or services that mentions or calls attention to those products 
or services can plausibly be portrayed as part of a sales effort that con-
stitutes commercial speech,17 including efforts designed to enhance 
the image of the seller as a good citizen in the production or distribu-
tion of its products.18 But efforts of a business to engender goodwill for 
itself and its products by referring only to matters of public policy or of 
societal interest in communications to which it attaches its name, but in 
which it does not suggest that it would be desirable to purchase its 
products, may not be commercial speech.19 To categorize as commer-
cial speech expression that suggests only the benefits of use of the 
product for the welfare of society, or for the state of the nation, or the 
world,20 presents troublesome problems if it is the kind of expression 
that the First Amendment would protect if it were freestanding.21 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
protection if the product whose purchase it urges is itself so entitled. See infra notes 212–
233 and accompanying text. 
17 The mere mention of the seller’s name can be said to call attention to its products, 
and in some contexts to suggest their purchase. In other contexts, however, the seller’s 
name does not have such an effect. Communications that merely mention the seller’s 
name, and deal only with matters of public interest, but not the sale or commercial virtues 
of the seller’s products, need not always be characterized as merely commercial speech. 
18 See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (review-
ing Nike’s use of press releases to respond to allegations about the mistreatment of its em-
ployees in foreign facilities, which resulted in lawsuits for unfair and deceptive practices). 
19 Comparable problems are raised by corporate public relations efforts, which aim to 
generate desirable publicity by stimulating the media to report favorably on their image or 
products. See Piety, supra note 3, at 400–10 (discussing how public relations campaigns 
should be treated under the First Amendment). To be sure, to narrow the concept of 
commercial speech may be to broaden the range of instances of speech that are likely to 
be covered by the First Amendment and therefore not easily regulable. 
20 See, e.g., Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 158–60. 
21 Cf. Kasky, 539 U.S. at 676–78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that although Nike’s 
press releases involved commercial speech, they concerned a matter of great public inter-
est and therefore warranted First Amendment protection). There are line-drawing prob-
lems in differentiating commercial speech, as described above, from noncommercial 
speech that the First Amendment unquestionably covers. Focusing on the aspiration of the 
communication to sell a specific, identified product or service, however, will bring differ-
entiation within the range of the feasible. Thus, one may designate as commercial speech 
certain attempts by businesses, including investor-owned corporations, to integrate their 
efforts to sell their products (or securities) with expressions of societal import (whether 
political or cultural) in ads directed to consumers or communications directed to inves-
tors. If the communication offers a product for sale, there is little reason to treat the com-
munication as other than commercial. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). If the communications do not expressly mention their 
products, it is less likely that they should be treated as commercial speech. How to treat 
communications that implicitly aim to sell products is problematic, but not more difficult 
1160 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1153 
case for denying First Amendment protection to narrow commercial 
speech is strong. Enriched commercial speech, however, may contain 
expression that would be covered by the First Amendment if it were not 
part of the selling effort. The presence of the transactional or promo-
tional message urging purchase of the product raises the question 
whether to preclude coverage by the First Amendment for the entire 
communication, or at least to deny the full First Amendment protec-
tion that the nontransactional component of the expression might oth-
erwise receive.22 
 These questions involve more than an abstract problem in catego-
rization and are not limited to an abstract determination of the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for expression to be classified properly as 
commercial speech. In practice, the question arises only in response to 
a particular regulatory effort—as by a statute ex ante (e.g., forbidding 
fraud) or by a judicial decision ex post (e.g., imposing liability for libel 
or other tortious behavior). The impact of the First Amendment on the 
constitutionality of the regulation may vary with the kind of harm that 
                                                                                                                      
than other line-drawing problems that courts address in determining First Amendment 
coverage. Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 35–40 (1986) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (arguing that First Amendment protection should extend to the com-
pany’s distribution of political editorials to customers in billing envelopes). 
22 Before examining those questions, it is worth noting that Congress’s constitutional 
authorization to regulate copyrighted or trademarked expression, has little, if any, rele-
vance to whether the expression is commercial speech. If the copyrighted or trademarked 
expression proposes a sale of products or services (other than the expression), then it is 
likely to be commercial speech, and its coverage by the First Amendment is not affected by 
a copyright or trademark. The tension between the command of the First Amendment and 
regulation of the exercise of the monopoly embodied by a copyright or trademark is gen-
erated only if the expression involved is otherwise covered by the First Amendment. That 
question of coverage is not affected by whether the expression is, or is not, copyrighted or 
trademarked, or indeed treated as part of an intellectual property regime. 
Copyright protection is authorized in order “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Its protection is made available, in fair part, to 
encourage individuals to create expression for the benefit of society. That such creations 
may also benefit the creator, or the consumer, as an individual, as well as a participating 
member of society, does not alter or detract from the societal function of copyright. 
Trademark protection is provided to benefit the user by aiding in the sale of products or 
services to members of society as individual consumers. Trademark protection does not 
serve the copyright policy of benefiting society collectively—except insofar as readers’ 
enjoyment or enrichment from seeing and considering a work aesthetically may affect 
society’s “culture.” In any event, whether the expression protected by copyright or trade-
mark is commercial speech turns on its content and context; the expression is not made 
commercial speech because it is trademarked or copyrighted. To be sure, it is difficult to 
find any trademarked expression that does not function to propose a sale of products or 
services. A copyrighted expression, however, may or may not entail a proposal to transact. 
If it does, it is commercial speech, and it is not made more or less protectable under the 
First Amendment by its copyright. 
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the government seeks to avert in regulating the speech, and how much 
abridgement of what kind of speech is required in order to avoid the 
harm.23 
B. The Values Served and the Speech Protected by the First Amendment 
 Others have pointed out that no single principle underpins the 
answer to the question: What speech does the First Amendment 
cover?24 And no grand theory justifies invoking its special protection 
for all expression claiming, or possibly entitled to, such protection. As 
often has been suggested, different values underlie the special treat-
ment that courts have crafted under the First Amendment to protect 
against government infringement of freedom of speech in different 
contexts. To seek answers to the question of First Amendment coverage 
or protection requires examination of the values underlying the First 
Amendment and their import for the interests that the government 
seeks to serve in regulating speech in varied societal contexts. 
 Much of the discussion of those values centers on the question of 
whether the special protection that the First Amendment offers for 
speech derives more from concern with the autonomy interests of indi-
vidual speakers or listeners in their personal or private affairs25 than 
from concern with the communal interests of the society. Those com-
munal interests include (1) the making of (or declining to make) col-
lective decisions in electoral matters, or more broadly in matters of 
public policy,26 and (2) the generation of the society’s collective values, 
                                                                                                                      
 
23 Government abridgement may take the form of compelling speech in sales efforts, 
as well as restraining speech. In the case of libel, regulation may be designed to protect the 
target of the speech from reputational or financial injury by reason of the audience heed-
ing the communication. On occasion, regulation of commercial speech is not aimed at the 
uses of speech to persuade a listener or to induce a transaction. The basis for subjecting a 
regulation to First Amendment scrutiny in such cases is unclear and uncertain. See, e.g., 
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1267–68. 
24 See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 3, at 1627; Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and 
Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 2353, 2365 (2000); Shiffrin, supra 
note 3, at 1214–15. 
25 See Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1122–23 (1993). The notion of individual autonomy 
that Professor Post ascribes to the First Amendment appears to be the autonomy of the 
person as citizen; that is, the autonomy that a citizen exercises (or invokes) when selecting 
a government, its structure, and its process, or participating in the formation of society’s 
values, as distinguished from the autonomy of the individual exercised in choosing among 
personal preferences disconnected from matters of self-government or societal interest or 
import. 
26 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93–94 (1980); Alexander Meik-
lejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Power of the People 27, 79 (1965); 
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tastes, and vision of itself in matters capaciously characterized as “cul-
tural.”27 The notion of autonomy that is urged as the basis for preclud-
ing government restraint on an individual’s freedom of speech is thus 
difficult to cabin. Varying content is given to this notion of autonomy 
by philosophers and legal commentators.28 But the range of conduct 
that respect for a person’s autonomy precludes the government from 
regulating is not unlimited.29 For instance, such respect does not pre-
                                                                                                                      
 
Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and 
Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299, 300–01 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 22–23 (1971). 
27 Protection for freedom of speech as the predicate for a tolerant society informs both 
the individual’s autonomy interests and the interests of an optimal society. See generally Lee 
C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (1986) (arguing that the true value of tolerating 
extremist speech stems from the respect of antisocial behavior that it elicits); Steven H. 
Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (1990) (arguing that a 
major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect those who dissent against traditional 
values and societal norms). 
28 See Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency 117–48 
(2003); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 
877, 879 (1963) (“The right to freedom of expression is justified first of all as the right of 
an individual purely in his capacity as an individual. It derives from the widely accepted 
premise of Western thought that the proper end of man is the realization of his character 
and potentialities as a human being.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 
Stan. L. Rev. 875, 879 (1994) (arguing that autonomy deserves status as a First Amend-
ment value but it must be “conceived dualistically” with both descriptive and ascriptive 
components); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. 443, 445–46 (1998). 
The function of freedom of speech in enriching or fulfilling the person’s “self” may be 
envisioned as enhancing her ability freely to make decisions about her choices in life and her 
role in the world. This enrichment and enhancement of decision-making capacity (i.e., self-
control) can be understood either as serving the personal benefit or satisfaction of the indi-
vidual, or as serving and amplifying the individual’s civic role as an active participant in de-
termining the quality and operation of society, or both. Cf. Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating 
Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 159, 186 (1997) (discussing the compatibility of Immanuel Kant’s 
concept of autonomy with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence). 
To cast the concept of autonomy in terms of “freedom of the mind” is not to equate 
the immunity from regulation of the operation or functioning of a person’s mind with 
immunity from regulation of a person’s speech. Nor do the considerations that support 
the former immunity from regulation require or justify the latter. However necessary 
speech may be to the operation of a person’s mind, the impact on society of a person’s 
exercise of the one differs from that of a person’s exercise of the other and pro tanto affects 
the level of deference to be paid to the individual’s autonomy claim in each case. See, e.g., 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (invoking the First Amendment to protect a 
person’s possession and exhibition of obscene movies in his own home, for only private 
use, but apparently permitting regulation interdicting the sale or distribution to the public 
of similarly obscene movies). 
29 It does not diminish the notion of autonomy, or the imperative for organized soci-
ety’s respect for an individual’s autonomy, to recognize that the freedom from government 
restraint that autonomy claims may vary with the context in which it is claimed—and it 
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clude the State from restricting or abridging the freedom of individuals 
to engage in many forms of conduct other than speech. The govern-
ment can—and often does—impose restrictions on such conduct, both 
ex ante and ex post, consistently with the harm principle.30 
 Similarly, if the behavior that the government seeks to regulate 
entails speech, that fact does not preclude the government from regu-
lating either the acts of speaking or listening, or the conduct that the 
speech discusses or urges—even though the government’s power to 
regulate the acts of speaking or listening may be weaker or more lim-
ited than its power to regulate the conduct that the speech describes, 
urges, or embodies. The strength and quality of the person’s autonomy 
claim in matters of speech, like that of the government’s countervailing 
regulatory power, will vary with the content and context of the speech 
involved. 
 In ascertaining whether any particular speech is covered or pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the values served by the possibly pro-
tected speech may be examined along two different, contrasting axes. 
Along one axis, the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect 
speech that enables, or enhances, the “self-fulfillment” of the individ-
ual.31 Along the other axis, whether cast in terms of impingement on an 
individual’s autonomy or in terms of society’s concern with protecting 
communal interests, the function of the First Amendment is to protect 
speech that enables or facilitates the operation, and enriches the quality, 
of a democratic, open society, and the role of its members in the collec-
tive process of creating and maintaining it. The special protection of the 
First Amendment serves to enable individuals to discuss, consider, and 
decide how a democratic society should be structured and function— 
both in terms of its government and in the broader terms of the charac-
ter and quality of its values and the attitudes and societal life it embod-
ies. An open society, in which freedom of speech is essential for con-
ducting and organizing collective matters and sharing values and atti-
tudes, is presumed to embody the optimal atmosphere in which 
individual citizens are free and able to enrich their personal lives.32 
                                                                                                                      
 
does not require the same level of deference to the individual’s choice in every context. 
Determining how far societal imperatives must yield to individual preferences or auton-
omy claims is a never-ending problem, at least in a democratic society. 
30 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 50–52 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859). 
31 The concepts of “self-fulfillment” and “self-realization” are often used by commenta-
tors, along with the concept of autonomy. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 28, at 879. 
32 See Bollinger, supra note 27, at 164–74; William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search 
for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1995). The First Amend-
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 Regulation of commercial speech thus raises interpretive questions 
as to whether the First Amendment should protect only speech that 
addresses or affects an individual’s participation in the structure and 
operation of society or should also protect expression that enables indi-
viduals to develop or enrich their personal lives, apart from their roles 
as participants in the operation and development of the society.33 
 In attempting to answer these questions and in assessing the con-
stitutionality of government regulation of commercial speech, it is ap-
propriate to consider why the government so acts. Government gener-
ally regulates commercial speech in order to avert one or both of two 
                                                                                                                      
ment can be said to serve the individual’s autonomy interest in personal self-realization 
only derivatively, by enabling an open, democratic society that is the predicate for living a 
full, rich personal life. It can also be argued that the First Amendment protects speech that 
more directly engages an individual’s autonomy interest in personal self-realization by 
protecting utterances and receipt of expression that serve any and all personal interests. 
Considerable authority suggests that the First Amendment may serve either function, 
not only the societal function. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 
577 (1978) (discussing speech as “an expression of self” that “enhances personal growth and 
self-realization”); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 593–94 (positing that free 
speech protection serves only to enhance “individual self-realization,” which includes both 
the development of an individual’s power and abilities and an individual’s control of his own 
destiny); Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, 53 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 195, 197 n.12 (1990)(“Freedom to speak without restraint provides the 
speaker with an inner satisfaction and realization of self-identity essential to individual ful-
fillment.”). See generally T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 519 (1979) (suggesting that the developmental function of the First Amend-
ment is directed more towards facilitating and protecting individuals’ activities as participants 
in sharing, structuring, and coloring the quality of the society than in private self-develop-
ment or decision making in matters of merely personal import). 
33 Commentators debate whether predicating First Amendment protection on the 
autonomy interests of individual speakers or listeners may preclude government regulation 
that is necessary to assure freedom of expression in matters of communal interest. Compare, 
e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1418–20 (1986) (argu-
ing that although regulation based on autonomy is designed to enrich public debate, it might 
have the opposite effect of narrowing choices and information available to the public), with 
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 630–35 (positing that a focus on individual 
autonomy could lead to protection for commercial speech because information from the 
marketplace is necessary for individuals to make the best choice as consumers), and Martin 
H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role 
of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1303, 1306–07 (2009) 
(theorizing that because of the danger of a majority regulating and censoring speech that 
others might value, government regulation should be minimal to ensure all parties have 
access to all the information they need). But if the First Amendment’s protection of speech 
can be read to serve the individual’s autonomy interest only (1) as the individual may be a 
participant in matters of public policy or communal concern and (2) as the regulated com-
mercial speech implicates those matters, the controversy is of small import. Similar consid-
erations would govern the government’s obligation to provide, or a person’s entitlement to 
receive, First Amendment protection in either case. 
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sorts of injury to consumers and resulting costs to society from address-
ees heeding the commercial message: (1) harm from being induced 
(by deception) to purchase a commodity or service that differs materi-
ally from what the speech reasonably leads them to believe, and (2) 
quite apart from that harm, injury from consuming, using, or possess-
ing the proffered product or service. Commercial speech encourages 
(or seeks to persuade) its addressees to engage in commercial ex-
change transactions, and to do so in a context in which there is often a 
large asymmetry between the speaker and the addressee or audience in 
relevant and knowledge about (and a comparably large asymmetry in 
the ability to comprehend) the transaction and its import. That asym-
metry is especially significant in a seller’s efforts at sales offered en 
masse to dispersed retail consumers; these efforts rarely attract (or in-
vite) critical responses or questions from competitors or third parties. It 
is difficult and costly (and sometimes impossible) for the consumer to 
overcome the consequences of that asymmetry. 
 Apart from the government’s interest in preventing the consumer 
from being misled by the seller’s speech to purchase a good or product 
that he does not desire, the government may seek to discourage con-
sumers from acquiring or consuming products or services, or engaging 
in activities that are more or less accurately described in the commer-
cial speech, because the government (reasonably) believes such con-
sumption or activities will injure the consumer or others physically or 
emotionally, or otherwise impose costs on society—and the govern-
ment has the constitutional power to regulate, and indeed forbid, that 
consumption or activity. 
II. Institutional Considerations 
 Before examining the sufficiency of autonomy-based considera-
tions to support First Amendment coverage or protection of commer-
cial speech, it is appropriate to examine the institutional considerations 
that differentiate commercial speech from speech that is protected by 
the First Amendment. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court brings commercial speech within the 
coverage of the First Amendment by imputing to the speech a content 
and function relevant to those constitutional values that focus on self-
government, public policy, and other matters of societal import.34 But 
                                                                                                                      
 
34 Commercial speech is purportedly covered by the First Amendment precisely be-
cause such speech is functionally part of the same public discourse that the First Amend-
1166 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1153 
the narrow contours of protection that the Court offers for commercial 
speech are not sufficient to serve those values. Instead, the lesser pro-
tection offered for commercial speech engages only an entirely differ-
ent constitutional value—an individual’s autonomy in conducting his 
(or her) personal life. Indeed, the protection offered is not compatible 
with the protection that would be required to promote the societal val-
ues that the Court formally relies upon to justify First Amendment pro-
tection for commercial speech.35 
 This suggests why false, misleading, or even only debatably accu-
rate commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment, in 
contrast to the tolerance required by the First Amendment for puta-
tively false or misleading expression in speech that addresses matters of 
public policy or self-government or otherwise engages matters of cul-
tural or societal interest.36 The tolerance for such false or misleading 
                                                                                                                      
 
ment otherwise covers. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363–65 (1977); Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–65 (1976). 
35 This incongruity results from the difference between the commercial communica-
tion’s sales message, which generally engages only personal interests in the sales transac-
tion, and its non–commercial expression, presumably in aid of that message, that engages 
societal values. If the First Amendment’s role is to address essentially societal interests, 
then the First Amendment protection for speech must be contoured differently than if the 
Amendment’s role is to advance merely the autonomy interests in the sales transaction of 
the seller or consumer of the proffered products. Justice Harry Blackmun does not ad-
dress the problem when he says of his effort to equate commercial speech to public dis-
course in Citizens Consumer Council that “even if the First Amendment were thought to be 
primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision making in a democracy, we could not 
say that the free flow of information does not serve that good.” 425 U.S. at 765. 
36 See In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (“Truthful advertising related to lawful ac-
tivities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. . . . Misleading advertising 
may be prohibited entirely.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) 
(“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. . . . But there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 
765 (1993) (holding that a ban on in-person solicitations by Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs) was unconstitutional and that CPAs are entitled to First Amendment protection 
when soliciting customers with “truthful, non-deceptive information proposing a lawful 
transaction”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (holding, in a case involving 
public statements against public officials, that “the knowingly false statement and the false 
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protec-
tion”); David Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 
541, 557 n.52 (1991) (arguing that if courts focused on the autonomy interests of the 
speaker, then they would have reason to protect defamatory falsehoods made maliciously, 
because “falsehood involves moral choice, especially when intended”). Compare Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 772 (stating that the First Amendment “does not prohibit the 
State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as 
freely” when the State is regulating false or misleading speech), with id. at 773 (holding 
that the State may not completely suppress truthful information about wholly lawful activi-
ties). See generally Christopher P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 669 (2010). 
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expression in speech in the latter cases is driven by the needs of a self-
governing, open37 society to leave “breathing space” for speakers who 
otherwise might be deterred from expressing uncertain or contestable 
truths.38 Such inhibition would deprive listeners and society of the “un-
inhibited, robust, and wide open”39 debate that is necessary for gener-
ating appropriate solutions for differences among participants in col-
lective affairs and would eliminate the constructive role of error in the 
truth-seeking process.40 
 Indeed, crucial conditions that justify some tolerance for false and 
misleading expression in the marketplace of ideas and the develop-
ment of the culture of a society are generally lacking in the context of 
commercial speech. The remedy of “more speech”41 that is necessary 
for productive debate, and is an essential premise underlying the con-
cept of freedom of speech, is not likely to be offered by a commercial 
speaker’s competitors, the constituency that has the most active interest 
in the matter. Competitors may claim to furnish a better, cheaper, or 
more attractive product or service; but they are unlikely to offer ad-
monitory comments on the safety or health characteristics or other 
risks or functional costs of their competitor’s offerings—with which 
their own products, or offered services, often share so many character-
istics.42 The small likelihood of productive responses by competing sell-
ers or other speakers to the expression in commercial speech may 
change, so that the remedy of more speech may become a viable com-
ponent of the practice of commercial speech. In recent years sellers 
have begun to challenge the accuracy of competitors’ claims, in court 
                                                                                                                      
The focus on falsehood suggests that First Amendment protection is addressed primarily 
to the transactional impact of speech. See Farber, supra note 3, at 386–89. Autonomy values 
are asserted in claims to protect non-commercial speech. But protection of speech to serve 
self-government or the pursuit of truth values requires a tolerance for falsehood that re-
spect for the autonomy of listeners may preclude. 
37 An open society is one whose members participate in determining societal values 
and attitudes, as well as government policies. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
38 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964)). 
39 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. 
40 See generally Mill, supra note 30 (explaining the importance of freedom of thought 
and discussion in creating a fully democratic society); John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of 
Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicenc’d Printing. To the Parliament of England (1644), in 
The Prose of John Milton 265 ( J. Max Patrick ed., 1967) (describing the societal harms 
inherent in restrictions on a free press). 
41 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”). 
42 See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 
90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 663–67 (1977). 
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and otherwise.43 But such challenges are infrequent, and likely to ad-
dress peripheral (and only commercial) aspects of those claims. And, 
the prospect of consumer challenges in response to sellers’ advertise-
ments (“ads”) is an even less likely source of more speech than com-
petitor challenges. This accentuates the troublesome effect of the ine-
quality in knowledge, comprehension, and wealth between speaker and 
dispersed listeners in much commercial speech; it thus calls for gov-
ernment power to attempt to achieve fairness for the consumer and the 
level playing field that is presumed as the basis for the efficient market 
in commercial transactions. 
 Moreover, in much commercial speech, the speaker’s concern is 
primarily, or only, with the choices to be made by individual consumers 
for their personal benefit, rather than for the benefit of society as a 
whole. The question that each consumer is presumed to ask in making 
his choice is: “What is good, or best, for me?” The speaker’s (seller’s) 
interest in society’s concern with such decisions is with aggregate choice 
rather than with collective choice.44 In the latter case, the question the 
addressee or member of the audience is presumed to ask is: “What is 
good, or best, for the community or society?” Such an inquiry is not of 
central concern to the speaker-seller or indeed to the listener-buyer. 
 The quality or quantity of speech that can fairly be said to respond 
or relate to speech engaged in sales efforts (by competitors, by con-
sumers, or by commentators or observers, such as the Consumers’ Un-
ion) is not remotely comparable to that of the sales literature. That dis-
parity is so great, as Professor Steven Shiffrin long ago pointed out,45 as 
to preclude such responsive expression from offering up the more 
speech, the availability of which the special protection of freedom of 
speech by the First Amendment rests. Unless the Internet or other de-
velopment modifies that balance significantly, the institutional differ-
ence between the availability of more speech in the domains of com-
mercial speech and of noncommercial speech (whether on matters of 
policy or politics or culture) deprives commercial speech of a necessary 
condition for invoking the First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Stuart Elliott, In a Battle for Turf, Sears Revs Up the Riding Mower, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
18, 2011, at B3 (illustrating the popular trend among corporations, such as Coca-Cola and 
Starbucks, to challenge directly their competitors’ claims within their own advertising 
campaigns). 
44 To be sure, when a consumer product becomes fashionable, the resulting accumula-
tion of consumers’ choices may be deemed more a collective choice than an aggregate of 
individual choices. But the products are offered by the seller for individual choice and 
benefit, in the hope of aggregate, not collective, success. 
45 See Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1229. 
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 The readier verifiability46 of commercial speech, and the more 
powerful and durable incentives for speaker-sellers in the commercial 
or transactional context, have been suggested by the Court as justifying 
limits on First Amendment protection for commercial speech.47 But 
those considerations are disputable. Possibly a seller who knows more 
about the quality of his product or service will be more truthful or in-
formative in urging its purchase. But the likelihood of that possibility 
producing sufficiently well-informed consumers remains to be demon-
strated—at least before restricting government regulation of commer-
cial speech in the interest of serving the parties’ autonomy. Neither the 
autonomy of the speaker or of the consumer is well-served, nor is the 
interest of society advanced, by unregulated commercial speech, whose 
essential function “derive[s] from confidence in its accuracy and reli-
ability.”48 Indeed, if respect for a person’s autonomy rarely justifies a 
speaker in uttering, or a listener in accepting, false or misleading 
communications,49 it is hardly a concern with autonomy that supports 
First Amendment protection for false or misleading expression even in 
noncommercial matters of societal import.50 The autonomy predicate 
for protecting the addressee or audience leaves little room for the 
“breathing space” that is advanced in support of First Amendment pro-
                                                                                                                      
46 Prohibiting misleading commercial speech is said to be less chilling because the mis-
leading character of such speech is more readily understood by, and known to, the speaker 
(who knows all the relevant “facts”) than in the case of opinionated non-commercial ex-
pression. Therefore, the speaker is less likely to remain silent for fear of mistakenly utter-
ing a prohibited falsehood. Moreover, it is suggested that the greater verifiability of com-
mercial speech operates to reduce the likelihood of perverse government prohibition of 
speech that is not misleading. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free 
Speech, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 152. The possibility that sometimes commercial speech may 
be more likely to be chilled than some non-commercial speech does not alter the general 
proposition of a lesser likelihood of chilling the former. See C.C. Laura Lin, Note, Corporate 
Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 459, 489–93 (1988). 
47 See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 379–81; Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 777–78. 
48 Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. 
49 See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891, 910 
(2002); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward A Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 62 (1974); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and 
Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 353–54 (1991). 
50 The notions that “there is no such thing as a false idea,” and that “there is no constitu-
tional value in false statements of fact,” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–40, reflect the significant differ-
ence between the values underlying protection of speech addressed to self-government mat-
ters or to pursuit of truth, for which some falsehood needs to be protected, and those pro-
tecting commercial speech, whose benefits “derive from confidence in its accuracy and 
reliability.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; see Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 
(1986). 
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tection of misleading or debatable expression on matters of public pol-
icy or self-government, or of more general import to society.51 
III. Autonomy Considerations 
 The autonomy for which the First Amendment’s special protection 
against regulation of commercial speech is claimed may be that of the 
speaker or that of the listener, or both. In any case, the claim is that ut-
terance or receipt of the expression may enrich the person’s mind, psy-
che, or persona and thus facilitate her self-realization or self-fulfill-
ment.52 That enrichment is made possible only if some notion of free-
dom of speech protects the speaker’s freedom to express his or her 
thoughts or wishes to another, and protects the listener’s freedom to 
receive and consider them.53 
 It is largely in the posture of the listener that the case law and 
commentators advance the First Amendment as a ground for protec-
tion of freedom of commercial speech.54 The notion is that any regula-
                                                                                                                      
 
51 The role of commercial speech, and the function generally served by regulating it, 
may also explain why content-based regulation of commercial speech need not offend the 
First Amendment, in contrast to its fatal impact on regulation of “covered” non-commercial 
speech. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 55–56 
(1987) (discussing the societal considerations that underlie First Amendment hostility to 
content-based regulation of speech); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First 
Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615, 655 (1991) (explaining that content discrimination is one 
of the most serious First Amendment concerns). Similarly, the First Amendment vagueness 
and overbreadth doctrines have little application in assessing First Amendment challenges to 
regulation of commercial speech. 
But societal considerations are less important, if indeed they are relevant, to fulfilling 
the only autonomy value that may fairly claim to be protected in commercial speech. In-
deed, that value may actually be disserved by failure to regulate falsehood broadly enough 
or by insistence upon forbidding content-related regulation of such speech. Similar con-
siderations may explain why compelling commercial speech to avoid misleading, or other-
wise injuring, the consumer does not suffer from the same vices as may comparably com-
pelling noncommercial speech. The permissible focus of regulation of commercial speech 
on protecting the individual consumer diminishes or eliminates the role of the principles 
that preclude First Amendment protection of compelled speech. See Seana Valentine Shif-
frin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 839, 870 (2005). 
52 Emerson, supra note 28, at 879–81. Professor Thomas Emerson, who emphasized 
the autonomy value underlying the First Amendment’s protection for speech, suggested 
that the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech. See Thomas I. Emerson, 
The System of Freedom of Expression 311, 447, 640 (1970). 
53 It is not clear how enhancing the range, or the understanding of the range, of 
choices by consumers, which is said to be a significant aspect of the listener’s autonomy in 
receiving commercial speech, is a relevant aspect of the speaker’s autonomy. 
54 Consider, however, the seller-speakers’ interest in, or right to make, choices. Cf. Loril-
lard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564–65 (2001) (focusing on the burden that outdoor 
advertising restrictions would place on cigar manufacturers with smaller advertising budgets). 
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tion limiting the quality or the quantity of the expression in commer-
cial speech that the listeners may receive from a willing and able 
speaker is an impermissible interference with the listener’s autonomy. 
Yet the conception of autonomy, which appears to be the dominant 
premise on which the Court rests First Amendment protection of 
commercial speech, may have more than one import. In matters of ex-
pression, its focus may be on speech that concerns enrichment or ful-
fillment of one’s personal life55 rather than on speech that involves 
one’s more or less conscious participation as a member of society in 
affecting societal decisions or values.56 Indeed, if the claim of auton-
omy as the predicate for First Amendment protection of commercial 
speech were based on the latter aspect, measuring its validity should 
test the claim by the proposition that protection should be available 
only for expression addressed to, or discussing, communal decisions or 
attributes and comparable subjects of societal interest—whether by way 
of participation in public policy or self-government, or in “pursuit of 
truth” on matters of “culture.” On that premise, it would require con-
tours of protection that such claims receive, but that the Court properly 
denies for commercial speech. 
 Whether First Amendment protection of commercial speech does 
(or should) serve one aspect of autonomy or the other (or both, or nei-
ther), requires examination of: (A) whether (and why) autonomy con-
siderations require greater protection of individuals against regulation 
of commercial speech than against regulation of the transactions the 
speech discusses or proposes, or of comparable commercial exchange 
                                                                                                                      
The listener’s right is an interest in learning from expression, whatever its source; but the 
listener does not have a right to demand a speaker where none appears. Cf. Va. State Phar-
macy Bd. vs. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). The First Amendment 
“is a protection enjoyed by . . . recipients of the information, and not solely, if at all, by the 
advertisers themselves.” Id. It “presupposes a willing speaker.” Id. It has been suggested that 
because freedom of commercial speech rests more on listeners’ than on speakers’ rights, the 
strictures against falsehood are justified. See Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 Vand. L. 
Rev. 693, 720 (2002); Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial 
Speech, 46 Brook. L. Rev. 437, 453–54 (1980). 
55 If the commercial speech being regulated contains only expression that is designed 
solely or principally to facilitate the transaction it proposes, the autonomy claim for its 
protection lacks the predicate of speech that engages or affects the listener’s interest in 
matters of self-government or public policy or other communal interests. 
56 More than occasionally, it has been suggested that the notion of autonomy engages 
both (1) reflecting and deciding how to live one’s own life as an individual human being 
and (2) reflecting and deciding one’s conduct or role as a participant in a self-governing 
society. See generally James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case 
of Autonomy (2006). 
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transactions, and (B) whether (and why) such commercial speech 
should, or should not, receive the same protection as does speech oth-
erwise covered by the First Amendment or indeed receive any First 
Amendment protection at all. 
A. Commercial Speech and Commercial Transactions 
 It is claimed that a vital component of a person’s autonomy inter-
est in freedom of commercial speech that seeks to enable or encourage 
an exchange transaction57 is the enrichment of the person that comes 
from the secondary process of uttering, receiving, considering and dis-
cussing information or views about possible uses or enjoyment of the 
speaker’s products or services, and reflecting about them and their re-
lation to satisfying or enjoying primary preferences.58 Uttering and re-
ceiving expression that thus enhances the range of a person’s knowl-
edge and ability to make choices about producing, selling, or buying 
goods, or freely exercising one’s will in such matters, is said to be a 
good that in itself fulfills the person as a moral agent entirely apart 
from the good of achieving the satisfaction of the primary preferences 
urged in commercial speech.59 Any government curtailment of the 
good involved in participating in that secondary process (which process 
is assumed to require, and expected to be a consequence of, freedom 
of commercial speech) is said to disrespect the humanity of the listener 
and improperly to interfere with the person’s autonomy more pro-
foundly than by directly regulating satisfaction of the primary prefer-
ence.60 Of these two different aspects of the relationship of commercial 
                                                                                                                      
57 Quite apart from considerations special to commercial speech, it is urged that 
“[t]he linkage of speech to thought, to each person’s central capacity to reason and won-
der, is what places it above other forms of fulfillment.” Smolla, supra note 32, at 200 n.22. It 
is puzzling to learn that the autonomy that precludes state regulation of speech because 
doing so “manipulate[s] people by, in part, taking over their thinking process,” Strauss, 
supra note 49, at 356, equally precludes regulation of commercial speech to avert similar 
manipulation by sellers of commercial products. It does not help to solve the puzzle to be 
told that autonomy “forbids that [one] cede to the state the authority to limit [one’s] use 
of [one’s] rational powers,” but apparently denies to the State the power to protect one 
from involuntarily ceding it to private power holders. Charles Fried, The New First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225, 233 (1992); see Fallon, supra 
note 28, at 893–99. 
58 See Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 4 (2003). This process of experience 
in making rational choices is said to require access to the widest range of information and 
ideas in order to enrich the person and to facilitate choices and acquisition of products, 
and thus to enjoy the full range of possibilities in one’s life. See Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, supra note 3, at 491. 
59 McGowan, supra note 3, at 411–29. 
60 Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 616–19. 
2012] The First Amendment and Commercial Speech 1173 
speech to autonomy,61 participation in the secondary process is the 
“good” urged most strongly to support the special protection of the 
First Amendment for commercial speech. 
 The differences between the two goods reflect relevant differences 
between the subjects of the recurring metaphoric references to “the 
market” and “the marketplace of ideas” —and the different roles of 
speech in each.62 The market operates functionally as a medium for 
the exchange of the property of its participants. Speech in that market 
is simply instrumental in effecting the exchange of that property. The 
benefit from exchanges of speech in the market accrues privately to 
individuals as sellers (generally speakers) and buyers (usually viewers or 
listeners). The market is famously said to transform the private benefit 
that individuals seek (from pursuit of personal gain by exchange of pri-
vate property) into public benefit to society by operation of the invisi-
ble hand.63 That market’s “proper” functioning in promoting the pub-
lic interest can be modeled and measured,64 however contestably. Its 
failure to function properly is a dominant justification for regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
61 Commentators suggest that narrow commercial speech serves more than the indi-
vidual’s possessive interest in self-improvement from merely considering the speech and its 
contents—for instance, that the experience of learning about and making choices among 
commercial products may develop one’s capacity to make rational decisions. See McGowan, 
supra note 3, at 411–16, 443–44. It may also enrich one’s capacity to participate as a mem-
ber of society in the process of making choices on matters of self-government or pursuit of 
truth. See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 618–19. Yet these suggestions are 
problematic on two grounds. First, as an empirical matter, it is unproven that skill and 
experience in rationally and fruitfully selecting consumer goods for personal enjoyment is, 
or can be, of any assistance in rationally and fruitfully selecting legislators or executives, or 
in deciding or appreciating matters of ideology, aesthetics, or collective societal values or 
attitudes. But cf. McGowan, supra note 3, at 411–16 (arguing that all commercial speech, 
even at its most basic level, aids the rational decision making of individuals and thus con-
tributes to rationality). Second, even if there is some carryover from the one to the other, 
the question is whether the cost of thus protecting freedom of narrow commercial speech 
is more than the cost of failing to do so by regulation. See Roger A. Shiner, Freedom of 
Commercial Expression 230 (2003). Respect for autonomy neither requires nor extends 
the same protection against government regulation of the opportunity to learn about each 
and every kind of choice. 
62 The failure to appreciate those differences may explain the incoherence in the 
rhetoric of “the marketplace of ideas.” See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in 
the First Amendment Tradition, 95 Yale L.J. 857, 879 (1986). 
63 See generally Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776) (introducing the 
concept of the invisible hand). 
64 Whether a market is functioning well or poorly may be determined by drawing on 
price equilibriums, quantifications, competition, and other such concepts. A market func-
tions properly when it comports with a model description or when it functions in accord 
with notions of efficiency in the production and distribution of goods. 
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intervention by the State and the resulting constraints on individual 
freedom to act in it. 
 In contrast to the market, the marketplace of ideas65 functions as a 
medium in which goods that are effectively public66 are exchanged or 
distributed, such as the content of speech containing the information or 
notions expressed. It transforms private action, often taken solely for 
private benefit, into public benefit, not derivatively by the operation of 
the invisible hand on gain-seeking exchanges of private property, but 
directly by the impact of the speech—speech regarding the collective 
decisions, values, or attitudes of society—on members of the public.67 It 
is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find a model by which to identify par-
ticular failures or defects in such an exchange process or a metric by 
which to measure defects as in the market, or to fashion appropriate 
regulatory responses. The societal benefit that is thought to emerge 
from the exchanges by individuals of the public good; that is, speech in 
the marketplace of ideas is part of, as well as the result of, the process of 
sharing that the exchanges entail, such as the collective tolerance for, 
and communal accommodation of, different (often conflicting) notions 
of fact or ideas, or values or attitudes expressed.68 That societal benefit 
                                                                                                                      
 
65 See Cole, supra note 62, at 879 (discussing the theory that the First Amendment pro-
tects a “free trade of ideas,” which justifies intervention by the government to save the 
“marketplace of ideas”); see also Fiss, supra note 33, at 1408–13. 
66 As an economic matter, the speaker cannot capture the full gain from the content of 
her speech. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 3, at 379–81. 
67 Speech works its effect directly on other individuals who are members of the society. 
To say “this is good for me because others choose it, and I want to look or act like others” 
is a form of participating in a collective choice, but not in initiating or formulating it, not-
withstanding that the choice is driven by the desire to “fit,” and thus helps to effectuate a 
collective preference expressed by other individuals. The aspiration is to benefit individu-
als, not the collective. 
68 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 
964, 967–81 (1978); Strauss, supra note 49, at 352–53. That there may not be any model by 
which to calculate, or metric to measure, a “perfect” market in ideas, as there may be to 
measure a perfect market for securities or for commodities or services, is not a justification 
for government refraining from intruding in, or regulating, the former, or for regulating 
both markets equally, or for neglecting to regulate either market. The First Amendment 
suggests that there are different constitutional limits on government efforts to remove or 
limit imperfections or defects in one market than in the other. Enriched commercial 
speech certainly functions in the latter market even if it may only sometimes function in 
the former. “Let the buyer beware” is not a divine admonition for all interchanges among 
people. There is little obstacle in the U.S. Constitution, or indeed in any broader under-
standing of morality, economics, philosophy, or politics, to inhibit application of that ad-
monition with respect to commercial speech as it is inhibited in the market for commodi-
ties or services in the interest of making such markets less imperfect, even if there may be 
a constitutional objection to similarly inhibiting that admonition in the market for ideas. 
Commercial expression is constitutionally regulable as it functions in the former market, 
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may itself offer enrichment to the individual, both as she participates in 
the shaping of society and as a recipient personally of the benefit from 
living in a society with so varied an array of tolerated inputs and oppor-
tunities.69 But its essential function is to enable (authorize?) appropri-
ately informed and discussed collective action (or inaction)—a function 
that is not touched by commercial speech unless (as may occasionally 
happen) that speech contains content that is more than necessary to 
serve the transactional interests of the participants, and touches matters 
of political, public policy, or other societal interest.70 
 Commercial speech functions (and addresses an audience) prin-
cipally in the market in which individuals seek to sell or acquire prod-
ucts or services for their own personal profit or benefit. It was long ago 
suggested that there is good reason to treat commercial speech (at least 
narrow commercial speech) as simply part of the transaction, but not as 
speech,71 or at least not as speech covered by the First Amendment.72 
                                                                                                                      
 
even if that same expression is not equally identically regulable in the latter. Compare In re 
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978) (holding that the state’s action against the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for soliciting legal clients violated the First Amendment 
because “[t]he ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression 
and association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public”), 
with Ohralik. v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1978) (holding that the state’s 
action to discipline a practicing lawyer for soliciting accident victims as clients did not vio-
late the First Amendment because his solicitations did not involve “political expression or 
an exercise of associational freedom”). The essential problem under the First Amendment 
is to identify the circumstances in which regulation of the commercial speech affects per-
missible restraints in the one market and has no constitutionally cognizable effects, or 
imposes no constitutionally impermissible restraints, in the other—that is, when speech 
driven by speakers’ efforts to sell services or commodities or services can be found to be 
nonregulable because its regulation implicates First Amendment values. 
69 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Those 
who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free 
to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail 
over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.”); Jack M. Balkin, 
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Soci-
ety, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 46 (2004). 
70 The aggregated or collective decisions of the participants in the one market need 
not reflect comparable considerations or the same allocation and weighting of the prefer-
ences of individuals in the other market. 
71 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003); 
United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 846 (10th Cir. 2005); Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, 
Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1317, 1334–35 (1988); Farber, supra note 
3, at 381–90; Geyh, supra note 3, at 43–52; Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspec-
tive, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 39–40 (1986); Strauss, supra note 49, at 353–68; Eugene Volokh, 
Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utter-
ances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1323--24 (2005). 
It can be argued that the incidental impact of the regulation on covered aspects of en-
riched commercial speech dilutes the imperative of the First Amendment and embeds the 
1176 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1153 
The notion that the regulated commercial speech is simply part of the 
commercial transaction, and not speech or expression at all, may rest 
on the content of any particular instantiation of commercial speech,73 
or may be more broadly based on the nature of all commercial speech, 
whose essential (and generally only) function is to enable or assist ef-
fectuation of the secondary process. Unless the commercial speech 
contains expression that alludes to, or touches on, matters of collective 
or public interest to the society and engages the interest of members of 
the audience in considering such matters in addition to (or other than) 
making the purchase, it is simply part of the commercial transaction it 
proposes. It offers its audience little more than does the transaction as 
a fulcrum on which to ratchet up special protection against govern-
ment regulation.74 That the commercial speech enables a listener to 
realize that he can choose among an array of products, in contrast to 
merely facilitating his acquisition of a particular product, does not sig-
nificantly alter its function, in serving the autonomy of the listener— 
unless the experience of learning to make choices among such prod-
ucts enhances one’s capacity to participate in the marketplace of ideas 
or in societal matters. 
 It is strongly argued that experience in uttering, receiving, and 
considering commercial speech has such value—for example, enhanc-
                                                                                                                      
inquiry in the softer soil of “time, place, and manner” analysis or “incidental effects” analysis. 
See Farber, supra note 3, at 381–82; Volokh, supra, at 1328; cf. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that an ordinance prohibiting 
adult movie theaters or bookstores from being within 500 feet of a residence did not violate 
the First Amendment because it mainly impacted commercial interests and only incidentally 
implicated speech concerns). Some regulatory efforts are driven by considerations that en-
gage both concerns, such as offers or advertising by professionals, or by medical pharmaceu-
ticals sellers who lack U.S. Food & Drug Administration approval, or possibly by tobacco or 
alcohol purveyors. Emphasis in regulation is on the failure of the advertising fully to over-
come import of information disparities between seller and buyer, even when there is no overt 
falsehood. Disparities in comprehension, as well as in information, result in incomplete in-
formation or admonition, such that the consumer is harmed by consuming products or ser-
vices by reason of her excusable and unremediable ignorance. See Madigan, 538 U.S. at 606. 
In that connection, it is irrelevant whether content discrimination has communicative impact 
narrowly defined or more broadly envisioned. See Heidi Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to 
Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First Amendment, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1339, 
1340 (2002); Williams, supra note 51, at 618. 
72 See Baker, supra note 3, at 196–197; Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Prob-
lem of Free Speech 234–40 (1993); Farber & Frickey, supra note 3, at 1621. 
73 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 279–80 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
74 See Farber, supra note 3, at 383. That members of the audience may derive pleasure 
or enrichment, either emotional or intellectual, from the process of receiving and viewing, 
or hearing, the content of the commercial speech, neither detracts from this conclusion 
nor implicates more than personal enrichment of, or enjoyment by, the individual. 
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ing one’s ability to make prudent choices in living one’s life in matters 
other than, or in addition to, making purchases for personal consump-
tion or enjoyment of proffered commercial products or services.75 
There is little support for that argument, in theory or in fact. The dif-
ferences between the focus of commercial speech and that of otherwise 
protected speech76 leave little room to assume such transfer of training. 
In the absence of service to such broader values, commercial speech 
disconnected from its instrumental role in aiding a purchase for the 
benefit of the seller or the purchaser offers simply the opportunity to 
contemplate the information (including images) it contains, and to 
consider or enjoy the portrayal of the choices it offers and the receipt 
of its message.77 That focus is on the same kind of possessive individual 
interest that is served by actual acquisition and use of the products or 
services (albeit in enjoying the expression rather than enjoying the 
product or service). 
 In that view, the autonomy basis of the individual’s claim for pro-
tection of commercial speech rests on his or her entitlement to enjoy 
the benefit or enrichment that he or she obtains as an individual from 
uttering or receiving expression about selling or consuming products 
or services. Enjoyment of that speech consists in benefit to the individ-
ual (as speaker or as listener) personally, as owner and possessor of a 
kind of property (information, images, ideas or visions) whose charac-
teristics and enjoyability may be thought to be more enriching or nec-
                                                                                                                      
75 See Baker, supra note 72, at 195; Post, supra note 3, at 1270–78; Redish, The Value of 
Free Speech, supra note 3, at 606–07; Richards, supra note 49, at 76–77; Strauss, supra note 
49, at 345. 
76 This refers to the difference between seeking answers to the questions: “Is it good 
(or better) for me?” and “Is it good (or better) for the community or society?” The ten-
dency to rely on considerations of private gain or benefit in answering the latter does not 
alter the significance of the difference between the two questions or the responses for 
which they call. Undoubtedly, protecting freedom of commercial speech in a society can 
enhance the capacity of individual members to acquire many sorts of information and 
understand opportunities that affect their personal values and attitudes in choosing how 
to conduct and enjoy their lives. Speech that offers to the individual an enhanced under-
standing of the commercial world in which she lives, and its impact on her, may indeed 
affect her interests as a member of society and her ability, as such, to participate in gener-
ating collective decisions, values and attitudes. Nevertheless, the aim of speakers in utter-
ing commercial speech and the likely import of such speech for listeners suggests that any 
expression it contains will neither seek nor have such impact on the audience. Unless the 
particular instance of commercial speech that government seeks to regulate invites, or 
implicates, such participation, it is doubtful that the speech offers the kind of self-
fulfillment or enrichment for which the First Amendment specially protects speech. Cf. 
McGowan, supra note 3, at 411–15. 
77 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brew-
ing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1995). 
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essary for self-realization or self-fulfillment as a human being78 than the 
possession and use of the material property whose purchase is advo-
cated.79 The listener is simply a consumer of (1) the expression about 
the desirability of acquiring the commodity, rather than of (2) the 
commodity itself, but in either case he is concerned with only his own 
benefit or pleasure. The enjoyment of the content of the expression 
may satisfy the possessive private interests of the individual intellectu-
ally, emotionally, or otherwise; it touches only obliquely, if at all, the 
individual’s capacity or interest in connecting with other members of 
the community in matters such as the development or sharing of com-
mon interests or views of the world, or communal values or ways of 
life.80 It does not alter this conclusion to formulate the benefit to the 
individual as enriching his mind or his psyche81—except as doing so is 
shown to enable an enhanced role as a participant in collective deci-
sions or shared attitudes or values. 
 But if the commercial speech serves only an individual’s private, 
personal interest—either in acquiring or selling a product, in uttering 
                                                                                                                      
78 Or, the enjoyment of this speech might be more closely related to an untrammeled 
capacity to exercise one’s will in making life’s choices. 
79 The First Amendment protects the individual listener’s interest in receiving speech 
on matters of public policy or otherwise of public interest. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
US. 753, 775–76 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 
301, 305 (1965). 
80 Citizens Consumer Council appears to reject this distinction, explaining that the com-
mercial speech is to be specially protected even though it is no more than a proposal of an 
exchange and involves no broader ambience. 425 U.S. at 760–761; see Sunstein, supra note 
72, at 141. It is possible analytically to differentiate the process of speaking or listening 
from the role of the content of the speech in affecting the listener’s more complete self-
identity or enjoyment of freedom of the mind. But the autonomy interest of the listener in 
learning about and considering the content of the proposal contained in narrow commer-
cial speech cannot be served unless she receives that speech. Interference with her receipt 
of that speech (even though the interference consists only in regulating its content) is 
then interference with her autonomy interest in learning about and considering that con-
tent. It is the claim for special protection of the latter that implicates the claim of First 
Amendment protection for her receipt of speech. Her autonomy interest in learning 
about and considering that content, or experiencing it, may be different; it is not, however, 
significantly greater than her autonomy interest in acquiring and using the offered prod-
uct if it is simply an interest in possessory private enjoyment of the content of the speech. 
Thus, it is no more protectable by the First Amendment against regulation than is acquisi-
tion and use of the product. In any event, the First Amendment enters the act only when 
the speech enhances participation in matters that may be of collective or public interest. 
But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that prohibiting the mere 
possession of obscene material violates the First Amendment). 
81 If such enrichment deserves greater protection against government regulation than 
does enrichment of the person’s lifestyle, it must be found in some other provision than 
the First Amendment. 
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an expression, or in receiving, digesting, and enjoying its content and 
the presentation of the choices it suggests—it is legitimate to ask, as 
have Professors R.H. Coase, Aaron Director and others: What justifies 
giving greater speech protection to the liberty interest of the speaker as 
purveyor, or the listener as consumer, than to the liberty interest of the 
person as seller, possessor, acquirer, or consumer of the proffered 
property?82 
B. Different Content and Different Contexts of Speech 
 On the assumption that commercial speech cannot properly be 
regarded as simply the equivalent (or part) of the transaction, it has 
been suggested that because it is speech and serves a communicative 
function of speech, commercial speech is entitled to the same special 
protection against government regulation as is other, protected 
speech—both morally and under the First Amendment. As a predicate 
for special First Amendment protection, however, commercial speech’s 
communicative function may not be sufficient to justify such protec-
tion. Like the question raised by Professors Coase and Director on the 
assumption that commercial speech is only the equivalent of transact-
ing; it can be asked, on the assumption that commercial speech is 
speech and not simply the equivalent of transacting: What, if anything, 
justifies according less First Amendment protection for commercial 
speech than is accorded the noncommercial speech it otherwise pro-
tects, and indeed any First Amendment protection for the former? 
 To attempt to answer these questions requires recognition and 
understanding of different kinds or contents and functions of speech— 
and the differing reach of the First Amendment for those different 
contents and functions. The utterance or hearing of meaningless 
sound is no more related to autonomy than are any other physical acts 
                                                                                                                      
82 See R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am. Econ. Rev. 384, 
384–85 (1974); Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Marketplace, 7 J.L. & Econ. 1, 6–7 
(1964). The argument is that receipt and consideration of speech, including commercial 
communications, stimulates a person’s imagination and capacity to reflect and choose, and 
it enhances a person’s capacity as a moral agent to understand one’s self and one’s exis-
tence. Speech, including commercial speech, is thus unique to, and of special value to, 
human individuals, in contrast to other, nonhuman, sentient beings. The relationship of 
communication with others to the human capacity to think, imagine, understand, and 
exercise “will,” is said to require special protection of communication. Smolla, supra note 
32, at 199; Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 591–92. But unless that proposi-
tion is self-evident, which it plainly is not, it remains to be demonstrated. Until then, and 
possibly even then, it is too fragile a premise on which to rest special First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech, given the resulting costs and risks to society. 
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in which a human participates as initiator, recipient, or bystander. 
Speech differs from meaningless sound, inter alia, in that it is an at-
tempt to communicate meaningfully by one person with another, or is 
so heard by an audience, so that it enables people to relate to one an-
other by affecting each other’s understanding and their actions or will 
to act. But not all such communication entails the speech that the First 
Amendment does, or should, protect. 
1. Self-Regarding Speech and Other-Regarding Speech 
 To recognize that exchange of various sorts of speech, in different 
contexts or with different content, may specially enhance a human be-
ing’s moral agency is not to say that each sort or instantiation of speech 
is equally entitled to special constitutional protection, either morally or 
legally to that provided by the First Amendment.83 In seeking to iden-
tify moral differences among the acts of speaking or listening, and the 
relationship of different kinds of speech to the autonomy of the par-
ticipants, one may proceed along more than one axis of inquiry, as 
noted earlier in this Article.84 
 Thus, speech can facilitate a person’s understanding of herself and 
enhance her capacity to fulfill herself personally—quite apart from its 
service in enabling her to function as a participant in communal activi-
ties or decisions, or in affecting communal values. The process (or fact) 
of contact and discussion with others can nurture (and help to fulfill) 
the same individual both as a private person (by, inter alia, relating to 
other individuals and experiencing both the benefits and costs of the 
relationship) and as a participant in determining societal decisions, val-
ues, and attitudes. The two kinds of service of speech often overlap, but 
speech can be parsed as serving humans in each capacity and serving 
them distinctly.85 It often is difficult to separate and identify expression 
                                                                                                                      
 
83 Not every instance of speech engages a person’s autonomy equally or entails behav-
ior of the same moral weight. See Smolla, supra note 32, at 197–98; Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, supra note 3, at 604. 
84 See supra notes 52–82 and accompanying text (explaining the autonomy considera-
tions of First Amendment protection in the context of commercial speech). 
85 To be sure, speech serves to facilitate relationships and experiences that contribute 
to the process of self-discovery and self-fulfillment; indeed, speech is itself an essential part 
of that process. For this reason, special protection of speech against government restric-
tion or intrusion may be justified. But the fact that expression encourages self-fulfillment 
or self-discovery through relationships with others does not, without more, bring the 
speech within coverage of the First Amendment. To be sure, a person who is thus enriched 
by expressive contact may be more likely to participate, or to participate differently, in the 
determination of the structure or quality of society than one who is not so enriched. But 
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that serves only individual development or only matters of societal in-
terest, or that contributes to both.86 Whether that difficulty is sufficient 
to require special protection of all such speech or none is debatable. 
 Of relevance in this connection is the fault line, occasionally refer-
enced by legal commentators on autonomy and freedom of speech, 
which distinguishes between the notion of individual autonomy that is 
served by “self-regarding” speech87 in the interest of “atomistic selfish 
individuals”88 and the notion of individual autonomy that concerns the 
individual acting as a participant in the collective determinations of the 
society. The latter aspects of autonomy are said to be served by “other-
regarding” speech offered by, or to, “people with different ideas and 
strong disagreements coming together as members of a community to 
discuss, and effectively to decide on, matters of interest to the commu-
nity.”89 The distinction tracks the difference between (a) linking a per-
son’s autonomy claim for First Amendment protection90 to her uttering 
or receiving speech as a participant in the sharing and the development 
                                                                                                                      
that result may follow as much from other acts that contribute to her self-fulfillment. The 
distinctive and specially protected function of speech in connecting the person to a par-
ticipatory role in the society is performed only by expression that addresses or stimulates 
interest in such participation. 
86 See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 
92 Colum. L. Rev. 2215, 2226–29 (1992) (reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991)) (discussing the interplay 
of societal and individual interests in individual decisions on personal matters). 
87 See Balkin, supra note 69, at 46. 
88 See Wells, supra note 28, at 186. 
89 Id. Compare Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 57 (1982) 
(noting that “[c]ommunication informs us of the choices and hypotheses made or suggested 
by others while also allowing us to refine our own thoughts through the necessity of articulat-
ing them”), Post, supra note 25, at 1116 (describing public discourse as “an arena within 
which citizens are free continuously to reconcile their differences and to (re)construct a 
distinctive and ever-changing national identity”), and Stone, supra note 51, at 55–57 (explain-
ing how removing certain points of view can dramatically alter the public debate), with Mur-
chison, supra note 28, at 503 (describing the listener as citizen as virtually indistinguishable 
from the listener as “individual”), and Fried, supra note 57, at 233 (detailing how free speech 
interests boil down to protecting the individual’s ability to make rational decisions for his 
own best interests). 
90 The notion that a person’s autonomy requires First Amendment protection of 
speech to, or by, her as an individual appears later in the development of First Amend-
ment discourse. See Emerson, supra note 28, at 878; Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra 
note 3, at 593. This is said to constitute a shift in the theory of free expression from a focus 
on the quality of society in the pursuit of truth to fulfillment of the individual, in part by 
enabling receipt of information and ideas that facilitate a broader and richer conception 
of one’s personal life. See Richard Moon, Lifestyle Advertising and Classical Freedom of Expres-
sion, 36 McGill L.J. 76, 90 (1991). 
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of the society’s values and attitudes,91 and (b) linking it to speech that 
serves to enhance her own personal growth or development as an indi-
vidual human being92 capable, among other things, of knowledgeably 
and freely making choices in life with respect to acquiring, using, and 
disposing of property or services, or attending to other matters that do 
not focus on, or indeed concern, a participatory role for her in collec-
tively developing, or sharing in, society’s values or attitudes.93 It is the 
latter aspect that drives the autonomy claims for First Amendment cov-
erage of the commercial speech whose content may not relate either to 
self-government values or to other matters of import for the society or 
its culture.94 
                                                                                                                      
 
91 A democratic culture is not “self-regarding.” Balkin, supra note 69, at 46 (“Communi-
cation is interaction, sharing, influencing and being influenced in turn. . . . [D]evelopment 
of the self is a project that one shares with others.”). That such sharing may enhance devel-
opment of the self in more or less personal terms need not implicate its impact on one’s role 
as a participating member of society or justify First Amendment protection. 
92 Id. 
93 An example of this is narrow commercial speech that serves only to enable individ-
ual listeners satisfactorily to give effect to (or decline) the transaction that the speech de-
scribes or proposes. 
94 The most articulate (and an early) explication of that claim is offered by Professor 
Martin Redish. See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 3, at 605–07; see also Martin 
H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis 45–48 (1984) (explaining the 
marketplace of ideas concept and arguing that to achieve self-realization an individual 
requires an unrestricted flow of information); Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the 
First Amendment, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 589, 593–98 (1996) (arguing that the public’s interest in 
receiving commercial information is often as important as its interest in receiving political 
information and therefore commercial speech should not be treated differently across the 
board); cf. R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. Legal Stud. 1, 9 (1977) (detailing 
the effects of commercial advertising, including the incidental effects that individuals’ 
behavior might have on public policy); Coase, supra note 82, at 385 (explaining that com-
mercial advertising is typically an expression of opinion that does not contribute to a na-
tional political conversation and therefore it is strange that it would be protected by the 
First Amendment); Redish & Mollen, supra note 33, at 1332–50 (outlining the theory that 
commercial speech deserves less protection than other forms of speech because it only 
conveys information and does not inform public discourse); Richard Schiro, Commercial 
Speech: The Demise of a Chimera, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 45, 94–95 (explaining that the Court’s 
willingness to protect commercial speech stems from the individual’s “right to know” in 
the marketplace of ideas); McGowan, supra note 3, at 431–36 (arguing that commercial 
speech should be protected on the basis of enhancing rationality and self-realization). 
A different conception of the autonomy interest that drives the First Amendment, and 
which would deny protection to commercial speech, is offered by Professor Edwin Baker. 
See Baker, supra note 49, at 936–37 (arguing that it is important to protect speech from 
corporate bodies because doing so preserves independent sources of information); Baker, 
supra note 68, at 967–81 (arguing that the protection of commercial speech stems from the 
need to protect the collective sharing of ideas); see also Baker, supra note 72, at 207 (ex-
plaining the argument that commercial speech is value-laden for those who desire such 
information and these values should be protected); cf. Schauer, supra note 89, at 15–72 
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 As Professor Robert Post has pointed out, First Amendment cover-
age of speech depends upon whether the speech is “situated in a social 
practice” that has special constitutionally protected value.95 It has in-
deed been suggested that other constitutional norms than the speech 
clauses of the First Amendment, such as those that implement an indi-
vidual’s autonomy interest against government intrusion into privacy or 
intimate association,96 may house the only appropriate mechanism to 
                                                                                                                      
 
(arguing that the most consistent and steadfast justification for free speech is that it leads 
to the “discovery of truth”); Emerson, supra note 28, at 879–81 (suggesting two justifica-
tions for protecting commercial speech, including individual autonomy interests and a 
free communication of ideas in a democratic society); Eugene Volokh, Speech Restrictions 
That Don’t Much Affect the Autonomy of Speakers, 27 Const. Comment. 347, 351–54 (2011) 
(arguing that extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech could be justi-
fied on the basis of protecting access to information and preserving the free flow of ideas 
in the marketplace). 
95 See Post, supra note 3, at 1270–78. This implicates the question whether the First 
Amendment protects “privately uttered speech” —that is, expression that is not made to 
the public, but that is addressed to, or received by, another person in one’s home or busi-
ness, or otherwise non-publicly. Whether such expression attracts First Amendment cover-
age even if it engages public policy or matters of interest to society is uncertain in doctrine 
and difficult to answer in principle. Compare Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001) 
(holding that the First Amendment protects publicizing the contents of an illegally inter-
cepted phone conversation regarding a collective bargaining agreement), with Stanley, 394 
U.S. at 568 (holding that the First Amendment prohibits criminalizing the mere possession 
of obscene material). But there is no reason to extend First Amendment coverage to such 
privately made communication about matters of no public interest, such as narrow com-
mercial speech or other expression on non-public matters. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757–61 (1985); cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 420–24 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect a public em-
ployee from discipline based on speech made within her official duties); Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that an employee’s First Amendment rights were not 
violated when the employee was fired for circulating a questionnaire concerning internal 
office affairs); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that statements 
made by public officials regarding public matters must be provided First Amendment pro-
tection even if directed at superiors); Christine Elzer, Note, The “Official Duties” Puzzle: 
Lower Courts’ Struggle with First Amendment Protection for Public Employees After Garcetti v. Ce-
ballos, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 367, 387–88 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s lack of guidance on 
First Amendment protection pursuant to official duties). Similarly, there is little reason to 
protect commercial speech to which the speaker attaches expression on a matter of public 
interest merely in order to aid the sale of its products or services. 
96 The Court’s reliance on the First Amendment (rather than other constitutional pro-
visions) to justify special protection of the enjoyment in one’s home of the content of al-
legedly obscene speech is quite incongruous if the protected enjoyment is of speech that is 
denied First Amendment protection in the market or in the marketplace of ideas. See, e.g., 
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. The incongruity disappears if the speech privately enjoyed is pro-
tected by the First Amendment in the marketplace of ideas. See Rodney A. Smolla, Informa-
tion as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1099, 1121–22 (2002); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some 
Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 697, 706–12 (2003); 
Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 
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provide special protection against government regulation of commer-
cial speech.97 If speech proposing a commercial sale of products or ser-
vices is to be entitled to more protection than the Constitution offers 
for consummating the proposed commercial transaction,98 it must be 
found elsewhere in the Constitution than in the First Amendment.99 It 
is speech’s persuasive or informative function for facilitating society’s 
collective actions (or interests or decisions) or nurturing social atti-
tudes and values that the First Amendment (and indeed democratic 
political theory) aims to protect specially against government regula-
                                                                                                                      
33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 421, 435 (2006); cf. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (holding that the First 
Amendment does not protect private speech that deals with matters of public concern). 
97 See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional Protection 
for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 285–94 (2005). For example, in determining 
which associations are entitled to special protection against government regulation, inti-
mate association commands special protection, but as part of the liberty of which a person 
may not be deprived without due process of law. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
617–18 (1984). We may assume that the good that commercial speech offers is enrichment 
of the mind about, and fuller knowledge or appreciation of, possible ways of living one’s 
life, and enhanced capacity to make choices in such matters freely and rationally. We may 
also assume that that good is closer to the core of individual autonomy than is the fulfill-
ment that comes from acquisition and enjoyment of the products or services offered. Its 
centrality to one’s being entitles it to especially rigorous protection against government 
restriction. But the First Amendment may not be the appropriate mechanism for provid-
ing that protection if the good to be protected does not reach beyond the personal fulfill-
ment embodied in private possession and use of the content of the commercial speech. In 
that case, the commercial speech, however essential, does not implicate the person’s 
autonomy interest as a participating member of society. Indeed, in apparent recognition of 
this limitation on First Amendment protection of commercial speech, it is suggested that 
enhancing a person’s capacity to make private, personal choices for his own benefit en-
hances his capacity to make choices about collective decisions for society. See McGowan, 
supra note 3, at 420. The argument appears to be that “learning to think rationally” in 
making commercial choices transfers to, and enhances, rationality in decision making in 
non-commercial contexts that implicate societal values or attitudes, or even matters of 
politics or public policy. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, supra note 3, at 
432–37; Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1191, 1194–95 
(1965); Robert B. Holt, Jr., Comment, Corporate Advocacy Advertising: When Business’ Right to 
Speak Threatens the Administration of Justice, 1979 Det. C.L. Rev. 623, 646--47; John S. Werts, 
Comment, The First Amendment and Consumer Protection: Commercial Advertising as Protected 
Speech, 50 Or. L. Rev. 177, 188–89 (1971). 
98 See Farber, supra note 3, at 386–91; see also Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 211–12 (not-
ing the significance of the Court’s extension of free speech protection to commercial adver-
tising in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, but arguing 
that certain forms of commercial speech should be awarded less than full protection). 
99 See Magarian, supra note 97, at 285–94; cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829–35 
(1974) (holding that a state regulation banning the media from access to prisoners did not 
violate the First Amendment because this was not information available to the general 
public); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844–50 (1974) (holding that a prison 
regulation denying the media face-to-face interviews with inmates did not violate the First 
Amendment because this was not publicly available information). 
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tion. But commercial speech’s persuasive or informative function is 
only to induce the purchase or sale of the products it proposes by or to 
individuals for their own consumption or enjoyment. Speech with so 
limited a function focuses only on individuals’ private or personal 
good,100 not on matters of public interest or the societal values or atti-
tudes with which the First Amendment is concerned.101 
 In sum, self-regarding speech (of which commercial speech is a 
kind) relates the individual (speaker or listener) to others and to society 
differently than does other-regarding speech.102 The two kinds of 
speech implicate different aspects of the notion of autonomy in deter-
mining the individual’s appropriate relationship to the State.103 Com-
mercial speech, except as it contains expression engaging matters of 
societal interest, is narrowly focused on personal benefit or fulfillment—
                                                                                                                      
100 See Post, supra note 15, at 321–35; Strauss, supra note 49, at 343–45; David A. Strauss, 
Rights and the System of Freedom of Expression, 1993 U. Chi. Legal F. 197, 206–07; see also Sarah 
C. Haan, Note, The “Persuasion Route” of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1281, 1284–96 (2000) (debunking the notion that commercial speech should be 
protected because of its function of providing information to the consuming public). It does 
not detract from this conclusion that individual choices driven by conceptions of self-benefit 
may result in imitative, or even aggregate, communal choices by individuals. 
101 See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469–72 (1997) (noting 
this difference explicitly); see also Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democ-
racy, Community, Management 7–8 (1995) (arguing that the ability to participate in 
public discourse is the foundation of democracy because it allows an individual to gain a 
sense of “democratic legitimacy”); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1567, 1571–74 (1999) (explaining the relationship between free speech and individ-
ual character); Post, supra note 15, at 7 (“Within public discourse, citizens forge, in the 
words of Learned Hand, the ‘public opinion which is the final source of government in a 
democratic state.’” (citation omitted)); Post, supra note 24, at 2361–62 (explaining how 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States shaped First Amendment 
considerations for criminal attempts). 
102 See Wells, supra note 28, at 159–61. The service of freedom of speech to a person’s 
autonomy interest may refer simply to the communication’s import to one’s self as an indi-
vidual who owns the content of the expressed or received speech and enjoys its content solely 
for her own self-regarding, development, or growth—an interest that may be characterized as 
a “liberty” interest. See Baker, supra note 72, at 198; Balkin, supra note 69, at 46. Or the good 
served may refer to the benefit to the individual as a participating member of society for 
whom the (commercial) speech opens visions of choices and channels of information and 
communication with others about common interests in self-government or other matters of 
societal import—an interest that may be characterized as a “fraternity” interest. 
103 That interest is served by such benefits as the speech offers to the individual as a par-
ticipant in society; it necessarily entails the societal good, or benefit, that comes from the 
sharing of speech by individuals—a sharing that is made possible by, and attributable to, the 
fact that, in more than one sense, speech is a public good. See Schauer, supra note 89, at 50–
52; David A.J. Richards, Toleration and Free Speech, 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 323, 334 (1988); 
Shelledy, supra note 36, at 548–553; cf. Emerson, supra note 28, at 879–80 (acknowledging the 
two similar yet different interests entailed in “self-fulfillment,” but according priority of im-
portance to the first mentioned interest and little significance to the latter). 
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a focus that suggests it has no greater claim to special protection of the 
First Amendment on grounds of autonomy than does a person’s sale, 
acquisition, or consumption of the goods or services that the speech 
proposes to sell. It is the relevance of speech to a human being as a so-
cial animal participating in generating the collective decisions, activities, 
attitudes, or values of society that points to the special role of freedom of 
speech and the particular function of the First Amendment. 
2. The Limits of First Amendment Protection 
 The claim for First Amendment protection of commercial speech 
thus raises the interpretive questions: (1) whether the First Amendment 
protects freedom for speech that entails only a private possessory inter-
est of the speaker or listener, or (2) whether for the First Amendment to 
cover it, the speech must (also, or only) engage the person’s interest as a 
participating member of society—such as, in connecting with other in-
dividuals in discussion and appreciation, or development, of societal 
decisions, interests, attitudes or values.104 In answering those questions, 
it is not necessary to deny that a role of speech or expression in society 
may entail satisfying or vindicating an individual’s private, personal in-
terest in enriching her mind and enhancing her capacity to make 
choices in such matters—as if it were an item of personal property. But 
the function of the speech that the First Amendment covers in protect-
ing individuals’ autonomy interests is essentially to facilitate or encour-
age the individual in connecting with the other members of the society 
as participants in effecting decisions by, and developing values, attitudes 
and tastes of, the communal enterprise.105 As others long ago pointed 
                                                                                                                      
 
104 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1976) (indicating that speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment because its expression enriches the speaker not only as an 
individual, but also as a participant in the creation of societal values); see also Joseph Raz, 
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 147 (1994) 
(arguing that censoring expression of certain ways of life prevents counter-majoritarian pref-
erences from gaining public recognition and acceptability); Balkin, supra note 69, at 29–33 
(explaining the connection between First Amendment protection and democracy); Vincent 
Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in Eternally Vigi-
lant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 60, 63 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 
2002) (arguing that a strong protection of free speech will foster a multitude of collective 
goals through impacting the character of the society); Wells, supra note 28, at 161 (arguing 
that the Court has attempted to balance individual concerns and community values in its 
First Amendment jurisprudence). 
105 See Sunstein, supra note 72, at 130–44; Baker, supra note 3, at 6–7; Jackson & 
Jeffries, supra note 10, at 5–6; cf. C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism 3 (1962) (positing that in the context of speech protection, “[t]he individ-
ual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor part of a larger social whole, but an owner of 
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out, the First Amendment cannot be read simply (or at all) to rest on 
extension of the Lochner v. New York (and Locke) notions of individual 
possessive interests that preclude government restrictions on human 
freedom of behavior, except as a case is made for the necessity of such 
restrictions to avoid harming others or society.106 Rather, if the First 
Amendment’s special protection is to be offered, the speech involved 
must entail matters of societal interest and the speakers’ or audience’s 
participation (or capacity to participate) in such matters—such as, for 
example, in matters that engage the individual’s (fraternity?) interest in 
connecting with others in considering, discussing, fashioning, and en-
joying shared communal decisions, values, ideas, and attitudes.107 
                                                                                                                      
himself”). There is a different “liberty” interest in receiving commercial speech than in 
receiving ideas that are not part of a solicitation of purchase. See Post, supra note 15, at 45–
48. It does not detract from this conclusion that a proposal of a transaction in an ad may 
not be an offer whose acceptance makes it part of a contract. See McGowan, supra note 3, at 
439–41; cf. Farber, supra note 3, at 373–76 (explaining that content-based regulation takes 
place with ads as well because the information in the ads is exactly what is being regu-
lated). Nor is it necessary to measure or rank the relative “values” of many different kinds 
of speech. It is enough to recognize that speech may serve different values and that the 
First Amendment should not protect speech that serves only individual interests in buying 
or selling property or services. It is also not relevant that, in the past, protection of free-
dom of speech was on occasion tied to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 761. 
106 See Paul G. Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution 119–20 (1962); 
Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale L.J. 1424, 1441–43 (1962); Jack-
son & Jeffries, supra note 10, at 5–6; Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Dis-
course: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv. 
L. Rev. 601, 626–33 (1990); Post, supra note 15, at 9; Post, supra note 24, at 2365; Fred C. 
Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 936, 952–57 (1987). But cf. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 760–61 (“Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize 
on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any newswor-
thy fact or to make general observations even about commercial matters.”). An essential 
premise on which First Amendment protection for commercial speech rests is the value to 
society of the free flow of ideas. That premise is too opaque. To start to unpack it, one may 
ask: Why is the free flow of commercial information to be protected more than the free flow 
of commerce? Inevitably, one must consider not only the speech’s effect on an individual’s 
personal development and enrichment, but also the speech’s function for individuals as par-
ticipants in the development and growth of a society’s values and attitudes. 
107 See Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle? Zechariah Chafee and the Social Interest in Free 
Speech, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 262--68; Post, supra note 101, at 119–78; Post, supra note 
15, at 15–18. Compare Fiss, supra note 33, at 1408–11 (arguing that only speech that “en-
rich[es] public debate” should be protected under the First Amendment to ensure that 
true collective identity is created), with Post, supra note 25, at 1120–23 (arguing that all 
speech must be protected under the First Amendment to ensure that the notion of a col-
lective identity is open-ended and not distorted by government interference). 
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 Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution108 re-
quires, or suggests, that the interests that the First Amendment protects 
are the same as the liberty or property interests of the person to speak 
or hear that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments have been interpreted to protect.109 To be sure, libertar-
ian “radicals” tried to weave such an understanding of freedom of 
speech into the constitutional design during the nineteenth century. As 
Professor David Rabban has pointed out, the autonomy claim to special 
protection against government restraints was urged for many kinds of 
individual behavior,110 on the ground that, as an integral component of 
the individual liberty protected by the Due Process Clauses, “speech on 
virtually any subject should be protected from legal regulation by the 
state.”111 When such views were pressed in the courts, however, they 
were scanted, without serious consideration.112 It is worth noting that 
                                                                                                                      
 
108 The history of the Constitution gives no clear answer to this question. Although 
commercial speech was known to the Founders, it is hard to find anything in their writings 
that suggests its inclusion in, or exclusion from, protected speech. See William Michael Tre-
anor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 466–67 (2005) (describing the 
ideological background of the Founders and suggesting a “public” function for the speech 
that the First Amendment protects); see also Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open 
Society 28 (1992) (explaining the difficulty of discerning the original intent of the Foun-
ders regarding free speech interests); David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common Law 
Question, in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era, supra note 104, at 32, 
33 (explaining that the views of the drafters and Framers of the Constitution are unclear as 
they pertain to the underpinnings of the First Amendment); Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial 
Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 737, 738 (1977) (illus-
trating the disagreement among constitutional scholars regarding the Framers’ understand-
ing of free speech); Richards, supra note 103, at 330–31 (arguing that it would be historically 
myopic to not attempt to implement the Founders’ understanding of free speech rights into 
our own construction of First Amendment jurisprudence); cf. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 
3, at 631–34 (explaining that the Framers’ commentary on freedom of speech focused en-
tirely on political speech and did not mention commercial speech). 
109 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947). 
110 Support for freedom of speech was repeatedly urged by abolitionists, freethinkers, 
proponents of freedom for women from assorted legal and related restrictions, propo-
nents of free love and free sexual activity (including advertising of contraceptives) and, by 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, freedom for labor and anarchist ideas. See 
David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years 23–128 (1997). 
111 Id. at 2. 
112 See, e.g., In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 133–34 (1892); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 
736–37 (1877). Doctrinally, the court dealt with the claim for freedom of speech as part of 
the liberty whose restriction required due process of law from the States. That may account 
for the result that the legislation generally upheld was state, not federal, legislation. See 
Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 153, 156–57 (2009). World War I 
brought the First Amendment to the scene. Therefore, variations appear in the strictness 
of the protection that due process and the First Amendment provide against regulation—
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this discourse, often relying on the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not distinguish between the autonomy value of 
speech and the value of freedom to conduct the many other aspects of 
life to which speech might be attached.113 
 The jurisprudence and scholarly discussion that produced the spe-
cial protective power of the First Amendment developed in the twenti-
eth century.114 It developed from an emphasis on protecting the values 
of democratic self-government and the pursuit of truth.115 To be sure, 
in 1947, the Court eloquently and powerfully invoked personal auton-
omy to require First Amendment protection of freedom of speech, al-
beit in a case involving compelled expression that was claimed to im-
pinge upon religious beliefs.116 The Court expanded that protection, 
and its premise, to speech about matters of public interest, including 
                                                                                                                      
albeit in results rather than in doctrine. These distinctions do not appear to affect the 
protection to be accorded to commercial speech. 
113 The broad focus matched John Stuart Mill’s classic statement that did not single 
out speech for special protection. See Mill, supra note 30, at 15–52 (incorporating the 
notion of individual autonomy into an understanding of the importance of free speech). 
But the assimilation of the speech to other libertarian-supported behavior may have re-
sulted from the perception that the First Amendment applied only to federal regulation, 
and due process was the only available shield against state regulation. The flavor of the 
arguments is demonstrated in a brief in an early Supreme Court case, in which the gov-
ernment argued that “the right to talk is no more sacred than the right to work.” Brief of 
Appellee at 22, United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (No. 561); see 
Rabban, supra note 110, at 135. It is not material, but not irrelevant, that the author of the 
observation was Attorney General James McReynolds. As Professor David Rabban points 
out, the great sanctity of the freedom to work as a “right” that precluded government regu-
lation before the 1930s was not matched by the sanctity of the freedom to speak. Rabban, 
supra note 110, at 135. And the reversal of those relative sanctities in the last half of the 
twentieth century does not appear to have been driven by consideration for a person’s 
autonomy as a private individual (i.e., apart from as a participant in societal matters). Id. 
114 Rabban, supra note 110, at 175 (“The overwhelming weight of judicial opinions in 
all jurisdictions before World War I offered little recognition, and even less protection, of 
free speech interests.”); cf. id. at 185 (discussing individualism in American law). 
115 It is interesting, if not entirely relevant, to note the continuing dispute among 
commentators over whether pre-twentieth century commentators on freedom of speech 
rested its special protection on individuals’ autonomy claims or on societal claims. See Bar-
zun, supra note 107, at 259--62. 
116 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette implicated the subject matter of the 
Religion Clauses, but the Court spoke in terms that rest more on the Speech Clause. 319 
U.S. 624, 642 (1943); cf. Shelledy, supra note 36, at 548 (describing a new branch of schol-
arship that emphasizes the Speech Clause’s placement among the other clauses of the First 
Amendment and believes that all the clauses protect “independent conscience and indi-
vidual moral sovereignty”). Commentators have also considered whether First Amendment 
protection against compelling speech rests more on avoiding mind conditioning and pre-
serving the integrity of the speaker or on protecting the audience from a wrong impres-
sion. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 870–72. 
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but not limited to matters of religion.117 Indeed, the powerful rhetoric 
in which it encased an early invocation of the First Amendment to pro-
tect a person’s autonomy addressed the freedom of speech of the indi-
vidual as a participant in society, and society’s collective interest in fos-
tering that freedom.118 The Court has also suggested (albeit with strong 
dissent) that speech on subjects that do not implicate or affect matters 
of societal interest is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.119 
 As Professor Post has pointed out,120 the Court’s jurisprudence 
that entails autonomy-based claims for protection of speech involves 
protection of the societal values that speech has, whether those values 
involve matters of self-government or more broadly, pursuit of truth or 
culture.121 Structurally and historically, the speech that the First 
Amendment addresses is expression on public matters or matters of 
interest to members of the public, in contrast to matters concerning 
only personal affairs or private interests. The expression thus protected 
functions to relate individuals freely to one another in societal enrich-
                                                                                                                      
117 Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–17 (1977) (holding that the First Amend-
ment prohibited the State from mandating individual participation in spreading an ideologi-
cal message by displaying it on private property, such as a vehicle license plate). It is not clear 
to what extent the “compelled contribution” decisions rest on personal autonomy (for pri-
vate beliefs) or on protection for speech entailing beliefs on public matters, or indeed on 
protection of the public image of the compelled contributor or avoidance of false public 
impression by the listener. 
118 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not 
matter much. . . . The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the 
heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”). 
119 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761–62 (stating that “[w]hether [any] speech ad-
dresses a matter of public concern [and therefore is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion] must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . . . as revealed 
by the whole record” (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48)). Speech that is “solely in the 
individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience” is not covered by the 
First Amendment. Id. at 762; see Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1214–15. But cf. Whitney, 274 U.S. 
at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.”). 
120 Post, supra note 15, at 47–48. 
121 Raz, supra note 104, at 146–49; Shiner, supra note 61, at 230; Balkin, supra note 69, 
at 46; Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. 
301, 314–21. As noted above, the Copyright Clause of the Constitution may reflect the 
perception that there is a constitutionally relevant difference between the private posses-
sory value of speech and the function and value of speech covered by the First Amend-
ment. It is not irrelevant to note that if the First Amendment covers commercial speech, 
dispute over the truth or falsity or misleading character of a speaker’s commercial expres-
sion may become a constitutional question and affect the rigor of judicial review. See, e.g., 
Natasha Singer, Foods with Benefits, or So They Say, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2011, at BU 1 (dis-
cussing the FTC’s effort to regulate ads of Pom Wonderful and similar ads by others). 
2012] The First Amendment and Commercial Speech 1191 
ment or decision making, rather than to encourage or enable fulfill-
ment in personal affairs. 
 The jurisprudence on freedom of association, which, like freedom 
of speech, derives its entitlement to special protection against govern-
ment regulation from the First Amendment, does not detract from this 
conclusion. The First Amendment’s special protection extends, apart 
from intimate association, only to expressive associations, or to other 
associations only as they utter expression on matters of public inter-
est,122 but not to their expression in connection with commercial ex-
change transactions, or the like. 
 Notwithstanding the Court’s enshrinement in 1976 of protection 
of commercial speech in the First Amendment,123 language in some,124 
and teaching in others,125 of its subsequent opinions suggest that the 
                                                                                                                      
 
122 Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 28 (1989); U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 631; NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 467 (1958). This result is no less required whether the content of 
the First Amendment is, or is not, imported into the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Adamson, 
332 U.S. at 58–59. 
123 Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 773. 
124 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 (holding that the First Amendment does not 
cover expression that does not involve any “strong [public] interest in the free flow of 
commercial information”). 
125 Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 439 (holding that the solicitation of private liti-
gants by nonprofit organizations that use litigation as a vehicle for political expression 
should be given First Amendment protection), with Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468 (holding that a 
private lawyer’s solicitation of a woman in the hospital soon after an automobile accident 
should not be given First Amendment protection). The bulk of Supreme Court cases pro-
tecting commercial speech under the First Amendment involve speech that touches on 
matters of public concern uttered more or less publicly. Some cases, involving speech by 
professionals in soliciting clients, address private solicitation (by mail or in person) of 
identified targets. Moreover, the speech being regulated was apparently the general prac-
tice of the professionals in such solicitations, so that it was relevantly equivalent to public 
utterance. The Court, however, has rejected First Amendment protection for privately 
uttered speech on private commercial matters. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. But cf. 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties they are not insulated by First Amendment protection); Bartnicki, 532 
U.S. at 533–34 (holding that privately uttered expression on matters of public concern 
does implicate First Amendment protection because it involves the publication of truthful 
information that the public is entitled to know). 
That such autonomy interest as may be the concern of the First Amendment is less indi-
vidual development or self-realization than benefit in arriving at societal decisions or values is 
also indicated, if not suggested, by the Constitution’s concern with limiting the inducement it 
offers to individuals in its protection of patents and copyrights. The individual development 
and self-realization from generating the ideas expressed in copyrighted works or the novelties 
embodied in patented works is limited by the restrictions in time and definition of what is 
protected—in order to benefit the collective public interest in response to the expression 
embodied in the work. The structure of those provisions reflects the concern that it is mat-
ters of public interest in the expression that are protected—even to limit the benefit to the 
creator in order to enhance the public benefit, and to deny such private benefit to expressers 
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First Amendment protects speech on public issues or matters of societal 
interest, but not speech concerning only an individual’s (or a corpora-
tion’s) commercial transactions or similar self-regarding matters.126 
The Court, however, recently reaffirmed the proposition that the First 
Amendment protects speech that is only commercial speech—indeed 
only narrow commercial speech.127 Sound considerations both of public 
policy and of political theory oppose that notion128—whether based on 
the argument that commercial speech is not speech because it consti-
tutes only a component of a transaction that is constitutionally regu-
lable,129 or, more broadly, that commercial speech is not the speech 
that the First Amendment protects unless it contains expression on 
matters relating to public policy decisions, or to the public interest. 
                                                                                                                      
of matters in the public domain. See Recent Case, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1446 (2008) (not-
ing that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P. “employed a presumption of unconstitutionality in a balancing 
test to hold that the First Amendment trumped a state common law right that restricted the 
use of information in the public domain”). 
Moreover, it is worth noting that notwithstanding dispute as to its importance in the 
common law of libel, the notion that freedom of speech is to be protected because it 
serves a public purpose, albeit at a cost (not fully compensable) to the autonomy interest 
of the private victim, is a recurring theme in common law and among nineteenth century 
commentators. See Barzun, supra note 107, at 259–62; cf. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469–70 (dis-
tinguishing marketing orders from regulations that violated the First Amendment because 
the marketing orders did not restrain communication, did not compel speech, and did not 
compel producers “to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views”); Zauderer 
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (distinguishing regulation of 
commercial speech by compelling contribution to its utterance or disclosure so long as its 
mandate did not require the compelled person to finance or endorse any political or ideo-
logical value or force orthodoxy in matters of opinion). 
126 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1995); Wa-
ters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669–70 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 
(1987); Connick, 461 U.S. at 149; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573; Meiklejohn, supra note 26, at 
27, 79; BeVier, supra note 26, at 300–01; Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at 
Work: From the First Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1463, 1492–93 (2007). Com-
pare Meiklejohn, supra note 26, at 19–28 (arguing that only certain kinds of speech 
should be protected because this system allows the public to arrive at truth and make the 
best decisions about matters of public interest), with Post, supra note 25, at 1122–23 (argu-
ing that no speech should be restricted regardless of content because we must consider the 
notion of a collective self-identity to be open-ended). 
127 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011); Estlund, supra note 126, at 
1469. 
128 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531–32 (1945) (explaining the blurry lines of 
distinction between commercial speech that should be protected and commercial speech 
that should not be protected). 
129 This approach requires judicial examination of the terms of the particular expres-
sion at issue to determine whether they are simply part of the transaction and not speech. 
See, e.g., Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673–2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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 The difference between commercial speech—that relates essen-
tially to benefits for, or development of, its recipient’s (or speaker’s) 
private self as an individual—and speech that nourishes her develop-
ment as a participating member of society also has relevance in assess-
ing regulation of commercial speech that offers or discusses sale of 
products or services whose offer and acceptance are independently 
protected by the First Amendment, such as books, movies, art, music, 
or theatrical performances. There is often reason to offer to such 
commercial speech the full protection of the First Amendment in order 
to respect whatever may be the audience’s or “author’s” special pro-
tected claim to choose or enjoy speech offerings that the commercial 
speaker is peddling, and that the First Amendment otherwise pro-
tects.130 Judicial opinions are less than clear on this point,131 as com-
mentators have noted.132 Similar considerations affect the scope of First 
                                                                                                                      
 
130 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 Iowa 
L. Rev. 995, 1057–61 (1998); Post, supra note 15, at 50–53 (explaining the difference be-
tween regulating speech in order to affect conduct that can be regulated, and regulating 
speech in order to affect public opinion). The commercial speech or speaker often func-
tions as an agent to publish or distribute expression by a person whose proposal is entitled 
to First Amendment protection (or would be so entitled if uttered by that person). Such 
utterance by the agent derives its claim to First Amendment protection to protect the 
principal’s claim for such protection for the utterance. Denial of protection to the agent 
need not preclude or limit full protection as if claimed directly by the author (as if simply 
uttered by her or him). 
But embedding that possibility in commercial speech generates the problem of inju-
ries that the commercial communication may cause, apart from impairment of the enti-
tlement to First Amendment protection that its product gives it. See infra notes 155--167 
and accompanying text (discussing narrow commercial speech). 
131 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700–02 (1977) (holding that 
states cannot ban ads for contraceptives merely on the grounds that they might be offen-
sive); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825–29 (1975) (holding that ads for procuring an 
abortion in New York were protected even though they were published in Virginia in a 
paid ad); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that ads sup-
porting the right of African Americans to vote were not commercial and were entitled to 
First Amendment protection). Whether or not those cases were formally treated as involv-
ing commercial speech, realistically they were treated as fully protected speech. First 
Amendment coverage of the communication or expression thus offered by the commer-
cial speech is determined by different considerations than are involved in determining 
whether the commercial message offering the expression is, or should be, covered. First 
Amendment protection of the private enjoyment of the speech product may not require 
protection of the commercial speech offering it. 
132 McGowan, supra note 3, at 418–19 (discussing incongruities in, and difficulties 
with, such reasoning); see also Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–74 (1989) (treating 
mixed speech as commercial and therefore not fully protected); Bolger v. Young Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (treating ads that include otherwise fully protected 
expression in commercial speech as entitled to only lesser protection); Merrill, supra note 
3, at 226–27, 235 (explaining the Court’s difficulties in drawing a clear line between pub-
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Amendment protection for speech soliciting contributions to religious 
institutions or nonprofit expressive associations.133 
C. Paternalism 
 Prohibiting or regulating truthful commercial communications 
about lawful activities134 that may be of interest to the listener is said to 
be especially objectionable interference, in that it paternalistically pre-
cludes the listener from knowledgeably deciding whether to risk or in-
                                                                                                                      
licly important advertising and publicly unimportant advertising); cf. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of 
the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790--95 (1988) (examining the difference between an expressive 
charity and a service charity in determining whether the act of soliciting contributions 
would be covered speech). What is the difference between expression for which the ex-
presser is paid (such as a lecture or a music lesson) and expression proposing a commer-
cial transaction, such as ads for the lecture or music lesson? If the former is protected by 
the First Amendment, then so should be the latter. The authors of the products being 
offered have mixed interests in the process (both in the commercial speech and in the 
emoluments of its use, as well as in offering the expression thus sold for the enjoyment or 
enrichment of their fellow citizens) that are both private possessory (enabled by copy-
right) and fraternal. The latter is what gives the offered product and the process of offer-
ing it for sale the special protection of the First Amendment. To the extent that the offeror 
is a mechanism for spreading such protected products he has a comparable claim to First 
Amendment protection. 
133 First Amendment protection is granted for solicitation of contributions to charities 
or charitable activities. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 611; Riley, 487 U.S. at 796; Sec’y of State of 
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 969–70 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 622, 639 (1980). First Amendment protection is 
also awarded to religious organizations. E.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 
147, 164 (1939). 
Arguably, if the conduct that the speech proposes is itself specially protected by the 
Constitution (e.g., abortion, contraception), so that the State cannot readily regulate it, 
there is little legitimate reason to permit the State to regulate speech proposing such con-
duct. Cf. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69 (holding that ads for contraceptives were “clearly protected 
by the First Amendment”); Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809 (holding that ads for abortion services 
in New York were protected under the First Amendment even though abortion was illegal 
in Virginia). Such considerations do not seem relevant for solicitations for contribution to 
charitable organizations that are neither religious nor expressive. Regulation designed to 
curb contributions to such enterprises because of the injury they may cause to the con-
tributor or to the public seems no more subject to constitutional restriction under the First 
Amendment than is comparable regulation of for-profit businesses, quite apart from the 
problem of diversion of a portion of the contributions to solicitors. This may explain the 
outcome of the 1987 Supreme Court case, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic 
Commission. 483 U.S. 522, 535–41 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee could 
restrict a nonprofit California corporation from using the word “Olympic” in its “Gay 
Olympic Games” and further holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit Con-
gress from granting exclusive use of a word even if there is no likelihood of confusion that 
would result in a trademark violation); see McGowan, supra note 3, at 402--05. 
134 Examples of such lawful activities are legally permitted gambling, smoking, or con-
suming alcoholic beverages. 
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cur such harm in two ways. First, it denies or obstructs the opportunity 
to learn about, and thus obstructing his ability to make, a possibly 
harmful choice to satisfy a preference in personal matters (e.g., to pur-
chase property) because the government (reasonably) believes satisfy-
ing that preference to be harmful to him or her, as well as to others. 
Second, alternatively, it obstructs the listener’s participation in the de-
mocratic process by concealing or obscuring the substantive policy or 
societal interests that might be involved,135 and on which the audience 
might have a legitimate collective voice. In either case, the claim of of-
fensive paternalism, even if accurate in describing the challenged regu-
lation or its operation, is little more than another form of the claim of 
impingement on autonomy, and is no more valid. 
 The predicate on which the charge of paternalism rests136 (the 
consumers’ ability to “perceive their own best interests . . . if they are 
well enough informed,”137 and to act upon that perception) assumes an 
apperceptive base of relevant information and knowledge. In the uni-
verse of retail mass marketing, the billions of dollars spent by sellers in 
the aggregate to acculturate consumers to desire products or services 
that may (or may not) create unspecified long-term health or safety 
problems, or other costs, are expenditures that are not offset (and are 
                                                                                                                      
135 Related to the claim of paternalism is the suggestion that such government interfer-
ence with commercial speech does, or attempts to, thwart the democratic process because it 
seeks to prevent or discourage by indirect behavior what government lacks the popular sup-
port to prevent or discourage directly and explicitly. In that process there is also an element 
of deception and manipulation. Obstructing the communication deprives the listeners of 
their opportunity to discuss the subject in the public square or oppose (or prepare to op-
pose) government regulation or prohibition of such behavior. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 
U.S. at 516 (holding that Rhode Island could not ban ads regarding liquor prices because 
selling liquor is not illegal and therefore consumers have a right to that information); Carey, 
431 U.S. at 700–02 (holding that states cannot ban ads for contraceptives because, although 
they might be offensive, consumers have a right to that information). 
136 The charge of paternalism is wholly misplaced if leveled against regulation that 
functions to protect the addressees of commercial speech against misperception of the 
benefits of the transaction because the speech is false or misleading. The charge is also 
misplaced to the extent that the regulation is aimed at the consequences of the incom-
pleteness of the tilted expression urging a purchase in a context of practically insur-
mountable informational asymmetry. Moreover, the charge is no less misplaced if the regu-
latory effort requires only informing the audience of the risks attendant upon use. Cf. 
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1205, 1237–47 (1988) (arguing that the Court has hinted at the govern-
ment’s paternalistic motivations to restrict commercial speech, but it has never explicitly 
accepted paternalism as a justification to uphold a government restriction); Post, supra 
note 15, at 20–26, 50–53 (arguing that the Court’s justifications for First Amendment pro-
tection imply that state regulations must be followed to ensure that accurate and truthful 
information continues to reach the general population). 
137 Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 770. 
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not likely to be offset without government regulation) by reasonably 
comparable nongovernmental expenditures for educative “debiasing” 
efforts.138 It is that background, structured by government-created 
property rules in a market economy, that enables sellers or offerors to 
shape consumer tastes and preferences so as to affect a consumer’s 
“free” choice in responding to offers.139 It also raises the question: 
Which government intervention is, or would be, “paternalistic?”140 Was 
the consumer’s relevant knowledge for making a choice enhanced by 
the Court’s constitutionally rejecting Virginia’s prohibition of price ad-
vertisements (“ads”) for prescription drugs, ads that, incidentally, did 
not allude to the possible varying quality of the pharmacists’ ser-
vices?141 Or was it enhanced by Virginia forbidding such ads without 
requiring sellers to discuss such matters with consumers? Either way, 
                                                                                                                      
138 See, e.g., Ronald Collins et al., Corporations and Commercial Speech, 30 Seattle U. L. 
Rev. 895, 917–21 (2007); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Eco-
nomics and the Case for “Asymmetrical Paternalism,” 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211, 1219–23 (2003); 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199, 199–203 
(2006); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 
175, 175–79 (2003). 
139 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 Tex. L. 
Rev. 697, 707–10 (1993) (explaining the realities of modern mass advertising in contem-
porary American culture); Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and 
Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 49–62 (2003) (arguing that the 
Court’s “acceptance of classical models of rationality” has enabled it to make doctrinal 
decisions that do not conform with real world decision making); Lowenstein, supra note 
136, at 1219–23 (noting the censoring effect of publishers’ receipts from tobacco ads on 
publishers’ willingness to publish contradictory information); Haan, supra note 100, at 
1285 (arguing that dicta in commercial speech cases suggests that the Court has been con-
cerned only with information that allows for relevant product comparison when emphasiz-
ing advertising’s informational value). As has long been understood: 
Consumer misperception of the costs and benefits associated with a product 
or service is prevalent. It can be the product of imperfect information or im-
perfect rationality (or both). It can be independent of any action taken by 
sellers. It can be instigated by sellers. And it can be mitigated by sellers. 
Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 33, 33 (2006). Sell-
ers know how to, and do, create “wants” in consumers without inducing consumers to 
“like” what they have been induced to “want.” See id. at 34–38. 
140 In other words, how uninformed or inadequately informed must reasonable con-
sumers be in order to justify government intervention to enable them to make the in-
formed choice that autonomy assumes? 
141 See Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 757. Would it have been paternalism for 
Virginia to require the price ads to include reference to, or discussion of, the quality of 
pharmacists’ “services”? Would this unconstitutionally compel speech? Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986). 
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the government’s intervention to enable the consumer “freely” to de-
termine her own best interests is (or is not) “paternalism.”142 
 Regulating commercial speech in order to discourage transac-
tional conduct that could constitutionally be prohibited (instead of 
regulating the conduct) is neither inconsistent with, nor a manipula-
tion of, the democratic process. That the government does not elimi-
nate the whole evil that it legitimately perceives, but instead proceeds 
piecemeal or by stages is not itself a valid constitutional objection.143 
Thus, the government may reasonably seek merely to discourage or 
modify consumption of truthfully described and offered products or 
services, whose use it both deems harmful and could legitimately re-
                                                                                                                      
142 There is little or no scope for the anti-paternalism argument in areas of commerce 
where the asymmetry of information or knowledge between sellers and buyers that the 
legal system enables and protects is too great to be overcome by normally situated buyers 
without some further government intervention. That condition generally obtains where 
regulation seeks to avert ill consequences to health or safety from mass retail marketing of 
credence goods—as with pharmaceuticals, foods, or professional services. For the govern-
ment to fail to intervene in speech offering or encouraging sales in such cases may be as 
“paternalistic” as would be regulatory intervention. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 139, at 51–
52; Lowenstein, supra note 136, at 1208; Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 270 (2006). 
Is regulation of the content of pharmaceuticals ads any more offensive paternalism than 
is regulating the description on the pharmaceutical packaging? See Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. at 757; cf. Post, supra note 15, at 50–53 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 579–83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (explaining that 
Justice John Paul Stevens’ arguments suggest that government cannot regulate information 
transmitted to consumers even if regulators are trying to achieve a legitimate purpose like 
curtailing energy consumption). As the Court has pointed out, on occasion, the govern-
ment’s aspiration (and function) to modify citizens’ behavior in acquisitory matters or pos-
sessory enjoyment of offered goods or services engages wholly different constitutional values 
from the aspiration to modify citizens’ understanding of, and opinions on, matters of public 
interest. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 579–83 (Stevens, J., concurring). The government’s 
aspirations also engage wholly different constitutional values from the administration of jus-
tice. Cf. Farber, supra note 3, at 402 (arguing that the Court’s rejection of paternalism in First 
Amendment cases is inconsistent with its acceptance of paternalism in traditional evidence 
law, which is rooted in the concept that some information is too misleading for juries to see). 
143 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002) (holding that the 
government could restrict commercial speech regarding prescription drug sales if such a 
restriction was necessary to advance a constitutionally permissible goal, such as limiting 
the sale of drugs to only those who clearly need them); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New 
York, 336 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1949) (holding that the New York state government can pro-
hibit ads on vehicles with an exception for those for the vehicle owner’s company without 
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution). That conclusion is equally valid 
whether the government so proceeds because it lacks (or believes it lacks) the popular 
support to affect the whole remedy it thinks appropriate and could constitutionally enact, 
or because it simply deems the evil to require no more than moderate regulation because, 
for example, the costs of a stronger remedy are not worth the gains. 
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strict or wholly prohibit.144 It is not required totally to forbid their con-
sumption or use, or to do nothing about the problem. 
 This proposition should be no less true when the lesser power thus 
invoked, instead of the greater, consists of regulating commercial speech 
instead of regulating the commercial transaction that the speech pro-
poses.145 Arguably the effect, if not the government’s objective, in regu-
lating commercial speech rather than the transaction may be to ob-
scure146 the opportunity for citizens to learn about the possibility of en-
gaging in particular conduct, and pro tanto to consider or discuss the 
communal aspects of the conduct, including whether and how to regu-
late it. But, nothing in the First Amendment (or claims of improper pa-
ternalism) suggests that sellers are entitled to offer, or listeners to re-
ceive offers of, sales transactions that the government could constitu-
tionally forbid. The sponsor of enriched commercial speech is well able 
to stimulate consideration of the communal values or public policy con-
siderations entailed in the speech discussing the suggested transactions 
without implanting the stimulus in the commercial communication.147 
                                                                                                                      
 
144 For example, this might include requiring consumer protective mechanisms in 
products like automobiles (e.g., brakes or safety belts) or children’s toys. 
145 The power to regulate such speech does not rest on the “greater includes the 
lesser” argument. See Berman, supra note 54, at 709–19, 742–43, 752--53; David McGowan, 
Approximately Speech, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1416, 1417–20 (2005); Strauss, supra note 49, at 359–
60; see also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1988) (holding that Colorado’s prohibi-
tion against paying circulators of initiative petitions violated the First Amendment because 
it suppressed political information without any reasonable justification). That commercial 
speech is necessarily linked to efforts to sell or exchange products whose exchange and 
use are regulable does not, without more, empower equivalent regulation of the speech. 
To be sure, it is that linkage that differentiates commercial speech from other (protected) 
speech. But arguably, commercial speech is different from the transaction it urges. Thus, 
regulation of commercial speech may impinge on different values from those that are 
involved in banning the transactions, so that justifying regulation of the speech requires 
examining considerations in addition to (or apart from) those justifying regulation of the 
transaction. See McGowan, supra note 3, at 375–76, 438. If a different, and greater, good is 
jeopardized by regulation of commercial speech than by regulation of the transaction of-
fered (and therefore should be specially protected), the justification for regulating com-
mercial speech must be found in a benefit other than that from forbidding enjoyment of 
the offered product or service. See id. at 436–39. But that other benefit is of concern to the 
First Amendment only as it engages a citizen’s participatory interest in the society—not if 
it serves only the individual’s private interest in learning about the opportunity to pur-
chase (or choose among) products or services to satisfy her personal possessory needs or 
interests. 
146 The regulation may obstruct or deter the seller’s expression, as by requiring sup-
plemental disclosure. It is hard to see why, if requiring truthful disclosure of relevant facts 
deters the speaker, there can be any First Amendment objection in the context of com-
mercial speech. 
147 See Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5; see also United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 
549, 551 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a defendant accused of aiding and abetting, and of 
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So long as the regulation of commercial speech does not preclude or 
discourage the speaker from such discussion other than in the commer-
cial speech, it is hard to see why the First Amendment’s special protec-
tion of speech should be required in the selling-buying effort as a condi-
tion to protecting discussion of the public interest in the transactions or 
in their regulation. Nothing in the values underlying the First Amend-
ment requires the speaker’s cost of engaging in, or stimulating, discus-
sion of matters of communal interest to be subsidized, or permits its 
message to be correspondingly colored, by permitting its stimulus to be 
planted in a transactional message.148 
 In sum, narrow commercial speech is not expression that serves 
any person’s autonomy interest that the First Amendment’s special pro-
tection can be said to reach.149 And, as others have pointedly explained, 
enriched commercial speech does not serve such interest unless its con-
                                                                                                                      
counseling violations of tax laws, was entitled to a potential First Amendment defense for 
his speech that pertained to matters outside the criminal activity); Berman, supra note 54, 
at 790–93; McGowan, supra note 145, at 1418–19. This may be less true in the case of inclu-
sion of references in commercial speech to matters of cultural as distinguished from po-
litical interest, or matters of public policy, because many such utterances may be “inextri-
cably intertwined” with the sales effort, meaning, inexpressible except as part of a sales 
pitch. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795–96. 
148 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458–59 (holding that the First Amendment does not pro-
hibit a regulation that forbids the conveyance of information as the solicitation of legal 
clients, but which is aimed at using such conveyance “as bait with which to obtain an 
agreement to represent them for a fee”); cf. Post, supra note 15, at 52–53 (arguing that 
First Amendment protection should be based not on whether or not consumer autonomy 
has been compromised but rather on “whether the ‘informational function’ of commercial 
speech has been unacceptably compromised”). Nor does such regulation disrespect the 
consumer’s autonomy interest in receiving the speech. But cf. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163–65 
(holding that a ban on distributing handbills violated the First Amendment because the 
distribution of pamphlets was an important method of disseminating information to citi-
zens who have a right to receive such information). 
149 Speech about conduct that is part of, or is related functionally to, the self-
government process or the truth-seeking process takes its entitlement to First Amendment 
protection from that relationship. Speech urging a buy-sell transaction that does not im-
plicate such processes lacks that predicate for First Amendment protection. Regulation of 
such speech, even if driven by a desire to discourage the conduct it urges, does not ob-
scure or interfere with the self-government or the truth-seeking process any more than 
would regulation of the transaction, because the speech’s function is simply to communi-
cate to individuals about private buy-sell decisions, not about matters of societal import. See 
Post, supra note 3, at 1272–79. That possibility may be less readily available for some cul-
tural references in commercial speech. Compare Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467–68 (holding that 
disciplinary proceedings administered against a lawyer for an in-person solicitation to rep-
resent an accident victim in a hospital did not violate the First Amendment), with In re 
Primus, 436 U.S. at 444–46 (holding that a private reprimand administered against a lawyer 
cooperating with a nonprofit organization for soliciting prospective litigants for litigation 
as a vehicle for political expression did violate the First Amendment). 
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tent and context engage the speaker’s or listener’s autonomy interest as 
a participant in the society—that is, interest in sharing with other mem-
bers of society matters of self-government, public policy, or other socie-
tal concerns, attitudes, values, or interest in affecting societal choices in 
such matters.150 Whether or not it does turns on the nature and extent 
of the explicit references to such matters in the communication— refer-
ences which functionally are likely to be collateral, and entirely subordi-
nate, to the sales function that drives the commercial communication. 
IV. Commercial Speech Containing Expression on Elective 
Matters, Public Policy, or Other Societal Matters  
That May Legitimately Entail the First Amendment 
 That the autonomy claims of speakers and listeners (as potential 
sellers or buyers) are not strong enough alone to justify extending to 
commercial speech the special protection that the First Amendment 
provides is implicit in the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions extending 
First Amendment protection to commercial speech (particularly in the 
early cases).151 The opinions strain to find, in the regulated commercial 
speech, expression that implicates matters of self-government or public 
policy, or other matters of “general public interest” or “culture.”152 It is 
the import of that expression in commercial speech that the Court 
seeks to entwine with the autonomy values that it believes underpin 
First Amendment protection.153 If the content of the regulated com-
mercial speech does not implicate those matters (or values), as is likely 
to be the case for narrow commercial speech, it is hard to see why (or 
how) the claimed regulatory interference with autonomy is sufficient to 
justify the First Amendment’s special protection. On the other hand, 
enriched commercial speech may, and occasionally does, contain ex-
pression that, if published other than as part of commercial speech, 
could plausibly claim First Amendment coverage.154 
                                                                                                                      
 
150 See supra notes 83–149 and accompanying text. 
151 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379–83 (1977); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770–73 (1976). 
152 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–64 
(1980); Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 760–61, 764; see also Vincent Blasi, The Patho-
logical Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 484–89 (1985). But see 
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1282; Stern, supra note 3, at 107. 
153 See generally Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (holding that statutory bans on 
advertising prescription drug prices violated the First Amendment). 
154 Commercial speech may contain expression that serves not merely to attempt to in-
duce members of the audience to purchase proffered products or services, but also to inter-
est them in the substance (i.e., meaning or import for societal problems) of the noncom-
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A. Narrow Commercial Speech 
 Narrow commercial speech has little, if any, connection with the 
self-government and related values or indeed, with matters of cultural 
import, that underpin the First Amendment prohibition against abridge- 
ment of freedom of speech.155 In creating First Amendment protection 
for commercial speech in the 1976 case, Citizens Consumer Council, the 
Court suggested that the narrow commercial speech at issue in the case 
was expression that the First Amendment protected, because the speech 
served self-government values and other matters of “general public in-
terest.”156 It rested that interpretation of the reach of the speech in part 
on the possibility that by reason of receiving such communications,157 
people might reflect on prices of pharmaceuticals and become inter-
ested in government action regulating the sale of such drugs, so that the 
advertisement (“ad”) (and the price information it conveyed) became 
an instrument in societal interaction and the democratic self-
government process of resolving issues of public policy.158 As Kathleen 
Sullivan aptly put it, the Court “diluted the notion of self-government to 
encompass decentralized exercises of consumer sovereignty.”159 That 
linkage, if valid, would imply extension to commercial speech of all the 
                                                                                                                      
mercial component of the speech, and thus to engage their autonomy not only as individual 
purchasers and consumers, but also as participants in creating and sharing societal decisions, 
values, or attitudes. See infra notes 212–233 and accompanying text (discussing the link be-
tween commercial speech and speech covered by the First Amendment). 
155 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[D]ebate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech 
and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about 
of political and social changes desired by the people.”). 
156 Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 762–65. 
157 The Court speculated that a consumer might have an interest in such communica-
tions that are “as keen if not keener by far, than the day’s most urgent political debate.” Id. 
at 763. 
158 Id. at 761–62, 764, 765; see also id. at 775–81 (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that 
factual claims within commercial advertising should be protected because these claims can 
be tested empirically and corrected so as not to disrupt the free flow of reliable informa-
tion). As Professor Robert Post explained, “If citizens learn from commercial advertising 
that pharmacy drugs are too expensive, for example, they might organize politically to 
advocate within public discourse for the creation of national health insurance.” Post, supra 
note 15, at 11. The commercial speech thus becomes “highly relevant to the formation of 
democratic public opinion.” Id.; see also McGowan, supra note 3, at 417–18 (arguing that 
commercial speech implicates the “rationality value” of First Amendment protection by 
providing consumers with information to distinguish among products and to make deci-
sions regarding regulation of products). 
159 Sullivan, supra note 46, at 138. 
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speech-protecting apparatus that the First Amendment requires for ex-
pression on matters of public policy or general public interest,160 a re-
sult from which the Court quite plainly recoiled.161 It made little effort 
to reconcile its recoil with the more extensive protection that the First 
Amendment offers to speech on such matters, which it suggested the 
protected commercial speech also addresses. 
 The interpretive process that the Court invoked to produce the 
claimed linkage between narrow commercial speech and speech oth-
erwise protected by the First Amendment leaves no stopping point.162 
All published commercial expression becomes “information” that may 
                                                                                                                      
160 A matter of general public interest would be, for example, creating “breathing 
space” for falsehood. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). Other examples would 
include prohibiting compelled speech or regulatory vagueness and overbreadth, or prior 
restraints or proposals for unlawful conduct or content regulation. 
161 See Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771–72 & n.24. 
162 In Citizens Consumer Council, the Court pointed out that although 
not all commercial messages contain . . . a very great public interest ele-
ment[,] [t]here are few to which such an element . . . could not be added. 
Our pharmacist, for example, could cast himself as a Commentator on store-
to-store disparities in drug prices, giving his own and those of a competitor as 
proof. We see little point in requiring him to do so, and little difference if he 
does not. 
Id. at 764–65. The Court also suggested, presumably as a reason for treating commercial 
speech as covered by the First Amendment, that “no line between publicly ‘interesting’ or 
‘important’ commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn.” Id. at 765. 
Similarly, in 1989, in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, the Court noted that “[i]t is possible to find 
some kernel of expression in almost every activity that a person undertakes.” 490 U.S. 19, 
25 (1989). And in Citizens Consumer Council, it said: “Even an individual ad, though entirely 
commercial, may be of general public interest.” 425 U.S. at 764; see also Holt, supra note 97, 
at 632–33 (“[T]he consumer’s interest in making an informed economic decision could 
encompass any information which might contribute to a choice of products or services, 
including not only facts about price and quality, but also material pertinent to the adver-
tiser’s reputation . . . or general worth to society.”). 
As Justice William Brennan pointed out in another First Amendment context, “because 
‘the stretch of [First Amendment] protection is theoretically endless,’ it must be invoked with 
discrimination and temperance.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 
(1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Address at the Dedication of the S.I. Newhouse Center 
for Law and Justice in Newark, New Jersey (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173, 177 
(1979)). “Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical statements that all information bears upon 
public issues; what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular government 
process is important in terms of that very process.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589; see 
also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 831 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for granting protection to commercial speech based on the content of such speech 
because the Court had previously not distinguished speech on the basis of content). 
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be “relevant to the voting of wise decisions”163 and is thereby covered by 
the First Amendment.164 The interpretive mechanism imputes societal 
aim to expression that is aimless with respect to self-government or 
public policy, or to matters of public or cultural interest.165 The 
ephemeral connection asserted between such commercial speech and 
expression on matters of self-government or public policy or of other 
societal import makes the Court’s articulated linkage too frail to pull 
the heavy load that often entails (1) effectively limiting government 
power to regulate the proposed transaction (and the ambiguous ex-
pression involved in inducing it),166 and (2) leveling down by diluting 
the protective power of the First Amendment in other contexts that 
                                                                                                                      
163 Post, supra note 15, at 14–15 (noting that “censorship of commercial speech does 
not endanger the process of democratic legitimation. . . . Instead it merely jeopardizes the 
circulation of information relevant to the voting of wise decisions.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). That peril is said to entitle the speech to some, but not full, First 
Amendment protection. Cf. McGowan, supra note 3, at 420–29 (arguing that “persuasive 
commercial speech,” or speech attempting to sell an idea or product to a consumer, war-
rants First Amendment protection because this type of speech helps individuals form a 
more robust view of themselves and the world). For example, auto ads implicate govern-
ment road building or speeding laws; clothing ads and cosmetics ads implicate safety and 
health concerns, as do those for food and drugs; and real estate ads may implicate zoning 
laws. Cf. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5 (“[M]any, if not most, products may be tied 
to public concerns with the environment, energy, economic policy, or individual health 
and safety.”); Post, supra note 15, at 15–20, 22 (arguing that the Court’s analysis of com-
mercial speech typically “turn[s] on charting and classifying the social world in order best 
to serve the constitutional value of democratic self-determination”). 
164 Expression that influences a listener’s personal development—intellectual, emo-
tional, or economic—may well have some effect on that person’s ultimate participation in 
(or impact on) the society’s collective decisions on matters of public policy, or on its “cul-
ture.” But it is too censorious to attribute to every particular array of diverse kinds of ex-
pression a basis for any subsequent particular conduct in the person’s behavior in the soci-
ety, which assimilates that behavior to the expression and makes the latter (expression) 
unregulable. Rather, it is the total persona of the individual, which is formed by many in-
fluences, including, to be sure, assorted kinds of speech. But the First Amendment pro-
tects only speech that can be shown to connect to the addressee’s participation in (or con-
sideration of) the society’s collective action (or restraint), or speech that engages his con-
tribution to its culture. 
165 Even if, as has been suggested, it is only regulated economic activity that tends “to 
attract speech bans,” regulation of speech involving such activity does not preclude freely 
discussing the issues (if any) publicly, apart from doing so as part of commercial speech. 
Neuborne, supra note 54, at 449. 
166 See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 10, at 14–25. This was a conclusion that the Court 
noted, and sought to avoid, by diluting the protection for speech that the First Amend-
ment protects for its self-government value if uttered in a commercial context. See Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 761, 764–65. 
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indisputably involve speech implicating matters of public policy or self-
government or of other societal import.167 
B. Enriched Commercial Speech 
 Enriched commercial speech, like narrow commercial speech, is 
offered by potential sellers in order to induce individuals to purchase 
their products or services—as consumers concerned with only their own 
personal benefit from, or interest in, such goods.168 On occasion, how-
ever, enriched commercial speech may contain expression that engages 
the audience’s interest in matters of self-government, public policy, or 
other societal import,169 and does not merely furnish information that 
may be of use for theoretically envisionable, if practically remote, con-
sideration of such matters. In an effort to enhance the attractiveness of 
their products or services, sellers may weave such considerations into 
their sales communications.170 They generate “image” ads,171 and some-
                                                                                                                      
 
167 This means diluting the strictures that regulate toleration of falsehood or proscribe 
vagueness in regulation or in other content-based regulation. Moreover, such speech is 
unlikely to trigger discussion of self-government or other matters that might be of public 
interest by the speaker’s business competitors who, like the speaker, do not want to make 
waves in which interest in purchasing their products can drown. 
168 This includes their status or standing in the eyes of fellow citizens. 
169 See McGowan, supra note 3, at 419. 
170 See Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1997) (re-
viewing the First Amendment implications of members of the egg industry leading an 
advertising campaign to convey how eggs are vital for good nutrition); In re R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 113 F.T.C. 344, 344–49 (1986) (reviewing the First Amendment implications 
of a tobacco company’s publication of a study on the health effects of cigarettes); Stern, 
supra note 3, at 122–23 (describing Mobil Corporation’s ads regarding the “uncertainty of 
climate change” and Trojan’s ads within pamphlets promoting safe sex); Cade, supra note 
3, at 249–51 (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)) (explaining how Nike’s statements about its business 
operations were correctly deemed entitled to protection as free speech by the California 
Supreme Court in Kasky v. Nike, because such speech protects the integrity of the market-
place); see also Chi. Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 
435 F.2d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1970) (reviewing the First Amendment implications of a labor 
union seeking injunctive relief to compel a newspaper to publish an editorial ad produced 
by the union); Fur Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 
16, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 501 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1974) (addressing a First Amendment 
challenge by major players in the fur industry to a manufacturer of synthetic furs who ad-
vertised about the inhumane practices of the fur industry). 
Nike, for example, responded to critical ads about its operations with its own ads, for 
which it claimed First Amendment coverage and full protection. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262–
63 (holding that when a corporation makes public statements about its labor practices and 
working conditions, those statements can be regulated to prevent deception to consum-
ers); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986) (holding 
that a commission’s order for a utility to place third-party newsletters in its billing state-
ments interfered with the utility’s First Amendment rights); Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 
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times even “issue” ads172 that may not be part of an explicit sales pro-
posal. The image ads often are effectively selling efforts that can fairly be 
characterized as commercial speech, at least as they imply purchase of 
                                                                                                                      
571–72 (holding that a total ban on promotional advertising for a utility company inter-
fered with the utility’s First Amendment rights); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (holding that the commission’s refusal to allow a 
utility to place inserts discussing controversial issues in its billing letters interfered with the 
utility’s First Amendment rights); McGowan, supra note 3, at 371–73 (explaining how the 
Supreme Court has continued to provide some First Amendment protection to commer-
cial speech but has backed away from providing full First Amendment protection to com-
mercial speech after Ohralik); cf. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 3, at 170, 184–94 (arguing 
that proxy statements should be entitled to the utmost First Amendment protection). 
In another mode, a pharmaceutical company might distribute to doctors scientific 
studies of its latest product explaining truthfully that the studies were made independently 
of the company by impartial scientists and were peer-reviewed. The U.S. Food & Drug 
Administration might then refuse to approve sale of the product if those studies are pub-
licly advertised unless all comparably independent (including unfavorable) studies are 
similarly distributed in tandem or as soon as they become public. See In re R.J. Reynolds, 113 
F.T.C. at 344–49; Geyh, supra note 3, at 52–71. But see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653, 2672 (2011) (holding that a state law restricting the disclosure of pharmacy records 
that reveal the practices of doctors did not advance an approved state interest and violated 
the First Amendment). On another level, a communication may be offered, as in the re-
cent advertising campaign by United Colors of Benetton, with a focus on political or ideo-
logical import. See Benetton’s Controversial Kissing Ads, Wash. Post (Nov, 17, 2011), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/benettons-controversial-kissing-ads/2011/11/17/ 
gIQA5qxZUN_gallery.html#photo=1 (displaying different world leaders kissing each other 
to promote peace). Or, communications or ads might be offered to counter admonitory 
warnings by government, as in In re R.J. Reynolds and Egg Nutrition, or by private parties, as 
in Kasky. See Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 572; Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247–48; In re R.J. Reynolds, 113 
F.T.C. at 344–49. 
171 Image ads are published to create a favorable image of the seller, sometimes by de-
piction of its operations (e.g., innovative labor policies) designed to demonstrate its reli-
ability as a supplier of goods and services, or of some of its other activities (e.g., environ-
mental sensitivities like conservation or waste management) or designed to show that it is a 
responsible citizen. See, e.g., Benetton’s Controversial Kissing Ads, supra note 170 (promoting 
peace through display of world leaders being affectionate); Environment, Honda, http:// 
automobiles.honda.com/civic-hybrid/environment.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (showing 
environmental benefits of the 2012 Honda Civic hybrid); Our Commitment Toward Sustainable 
Business, Bank of Am., http://environment.bankofamerica.com/commitment/index.html 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (showing Bank of America’s commitment to environmental 
sustainability); (Red) Fighting for an AIDS Free Generation, (Red), http://www.joinred.com/ 
partners (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (showing corporate partners in the fight against 
AIDS). Such ads may offend some people, but the seller apparently believes that they will 
appeal sufficiently strongly to a sufficiently large constituency to be worth the risk of loss of 
some people. The term “advocacy advertising” is sometimes used to cover both image ads 
and issue ads. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 97, at 623–27. 
172 Issue ads are less concerned with creating a favorable image of the corporation’s 
operations or activities than with encouraging support for public policies which the corpo-
ration presumably believes will help in its business. See Stern, supra note 3, at 122–23. 
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the ads’ sponsors’ identified products or services.173 Issue ads on matters 
of public policy are likely to be less tightly tied to sales efforts, and on 
occasion may not be treatable as only commercial speech. 
 But, not every expression whose content might plausibly claim 
First Amendment coverage is entitled to such protection whenever it is 
uttered. Context may wholly disqualify such expression from, or limit its 
entitlement to, First Amendment protection.174 In the case of commer-
cial speech, the question is: What is the impact of that context on enti-
tlement to First Amendment coverage of expression that would, or 
likely might, be covered if uttered other than as part of commercial 
speech—for example, on the hustings on street corners or on televi-
sion, in a classroom, in a theatre or in comparable contexts?175 
 To aid that inquiry, it is useful to divide all such expression into 
two categories: (1) expression engaging matters of self-government or 
public policy, entailing government action (or refusal or failure to act), 
and (2) expression engaging other matters of societal import, such as is 
offered in literature, art and music, or in portrayals of lifestyles in ads 
                                                                                                                      
173 Compare Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983) (holding 
that unsolicited mailings regarding contraceptives are entitled to speech protection), with 
Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 163 (holding that restrictions on misleading or false ads regard-
ing egg nutrition did not violate the First Amendment). No readily satisfactory criteria 
enable lines to be drawn between issue or image ads that are part of commercial speech 
and those that are not. 
174 For example, fighting words, obscenity, and speech by public employees may be in-
eligible for coverage. Sales expression need not become speech protected by the First 
Amendment if, or because, it is included in a statistical presentation compiled by the seller 
or others for use in the sales process. But cf. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262–63 (2006) 
(holding that limits on contributions to political parties violated the First Amendment’s 
free speech protection). Also consider, for example, speech that is part of the behavior 
that violates the antitrust laws. Compare FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 
411, 425–28 (1990) (reasoning that a boycott orchestrated by lawyers for indigent defen-
dants was not entitled to First Amendment protection because the lawyers sought to in-
crease their own compensation), with NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 
909–13 (1982) (reasoning that a civil rights boycott of white merchants was entitled to First 
Amendment protection because it sought to “change a social order that had consistently 
treated [blacks] as second-class citizens”). This is not to say that use of the compilation 
other than in the sales process—for example, as part of general statistical information—
may or may not be protected by the First Amendment. See supra notes 9–29 and accompa-
nying text (defining different types of commercial speech). 
175 The content that sellers instill in commercial speech urging purchase of their prod-
ucts or services varies widely, and its range is limited only by the limits of sellers’ or their ad-
vertisers’ fertile imaginations. It may contain allusions to matters of self-government or public 
policy (e.g., to claims to preferability of synthetic to natural furs, of local manufacturing to 
outsourcing, or of greening) as well as to matters of lifestyle (e.g., in personal appearance 
like clothes, jewelry, or body shape or beauty aids, or in material possessions like automobiles, 
houses, or athletic equipment) or more conventional notions of culture (e.g., art, literature, 
music, theatre, movies, athletic events). See supra notes 168--173 and accompanying text. 
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or otherwise, or other content that entails the capacious concept of the 
culture of the society. It does not detract from the usefulness of this di-
vision that particular instances of commercial speech may often engage 
both categories.176 
1. Matters of Self-Government or Public Policy 
 The seller’s interest in referring to matters of self-government or 
public policy in its commercial speech is generally, if not indeed always, 
only to stimulate its audience’s interest in buying the products it prof-
fers. In some instances, its expression on policy or electoral matters 
may be so probing or central that (to borrow from Justice Potter Stew-
art) the entire communication is “integrally related to the exposition of 
thought”177 about those matters. More often, however, the speaker’s 
sales aspiration will not result in expression that encourages the audi-
ence to make the cerebral waves that such articulated thought might 
produce. On the contrary, the aim is to select for inclusion in the sales 
pitch only public policy subjects on which the seller believes there is 
little dispute and much agreement among a large audience whom it 
seeks to induce to buy its products or services. It will encase its presen-
tation in terms that it expects the audience to find congenial and not 
subject to challenge. The rational seller rarely wants the consumer to 
consider the substance of the public policy matters to which its presen-
tation may allude. Any such consideration will not only divert attention 
from the product and may dilute the appeal of acquiring it, but it may 
also create questions about the usefulness or desirability of the product 
which the ad seeks to stimulate. Hence if the policy expression serves as 
intended—that is, as undisputable “window-dressing”178 in aid of the 
sale—it is not likely to suggest the concern with the persuasiveness of 
the expression on the matter of public policy or public interest at which 
                                                                                                                      
176 For example, “green” ads that proclaim the environmental friendliness of a seller 
and its products may fall in both categories. See Environment, supra note 171; Our Commit-
ment Toward Sustainable Business, supra note 171; see also In re R.J. Reynolds, 113 F.T.C. at 344–
49 (reviewing the First Amendment implications of a tobacco company promoting that the 
health effects of cigarettes are still unclear). 
177 Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
178 See, e.g., Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War, Lucky Strike (on file with author); cf. 
Stephanie Clifford, On the Stump, for Consumers, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2008, at C7 (discussing a 
Unilever advertising campaign to sell margarine by mimicking incidents in the 2008 Obama-
Clinton primary contest); Environment, supra note 171 (showing the environmental benefits 
of owning a Honda Civic hybrid); Our Commitment Toward Sustainable Business, supra note 171 
(showing Bank of America’s commitment to an environmentally sustainable business model). 
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First Amendment protection is aimed.179 In short, the seller’s refer-
ences to public policy are neither intended, nor likely, to illuminate or 
stimulate discussion of (or interest in) any matters of public policy to 
which they may allude.180 Their form and intended function (such as 
to help induce the consumer to buy) discourage any reaction other 
than favorable (albeit passive) notice of the policy, whose adoption is 
presumably encouraged by owning or consuming the product or ser-
vice.181 
                                                                                                                      
179 In Professor Post’s terms, the expression is not “dialogic,” and therefore is not cov-
ered by the First Amendment. See Post, supra note 3, at 1254. The noncommercial compo-
nent—for example, claiming that the sale of the speaker’s products helps or coincides with 
American foreign policy—even if it is true, is being used to sell a product that (whether 
the claim is false or true) will not perform as promised. To proscribe that communication 
may silence a commercial falsehood, but it does not deter or indeed affect discussion of 
the public matters of foreign policy, because the expression in its context was not intended 
to evoke such discussion, and in any event was not likely to provoke others (like competi-
tors) to engage in such discussion. The regulation that is otherwise constitutional, but thus 
incidentally impinges on a possible public consideration of a self-government matter does 
not offend the First Amendment. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). 
180 The problem is particularly acute if the regulation is aimed at the deceptive impact 
of the communication, on the assumption that the misleading expression is material to 
inducing the purchase. See Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 160–61; Fargo Women’s Health Org., 
Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 179–83 (N.D. 1986); supra notes 34–51 and accompanying 
text. To be “material,” the misleading proposition’s function in the communication must 
be less to implicate discussion of self-government matters than to induce purchase of the 
seller’s goods or services. Thus, if the statement of the use of artificial rather than natural 
fur in Fur Information & Fashion Council, or the employment of American rather than for-
eign labor in Chicago Joint Board, were false, they were materially misleading. If the false-
hood is not material, the likelihood of its inseparability is small and there is, therefore, no 
need to include the policy component of the message with the commercial proposal. An-
other example would be an ad claiming that Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
or environmental protection legislation is bad because it disadvantages all American pro-
ducers, including the advertiser, as against foreign suppliers who have no “safety” obliga-
tions to their employees, or who produce coal or oil but who are not subject to similar 
regulation. Do such expressions have to be tied to a sales pitch? What if the foreign enter-
prises are subject to comparable regulation? Is the falsehood (if any) resulting from the 
failure to point this out? See Allen W. Bird, II et al., Corporate Image Advertising: A Discussion 
of the Factors That Distinguish Those Corporate Image Advertising Practices Protected Under the First 
Amendment from Those Subject to Control by the Federal Trade Commission, 51 J. Urb. L. 405, 418 
(1973); Merrill, supra note 3, at 233. 
181 A candidate’s statement that encouraging domestic production of a certain kind of 
product will help the economy may be protected by the First Amendment despite its falsity, 
and even his indifference to its falsity, particularly in light of the likelihood of response by 
opposing candidates. But a similar claim by a producer of the product in its sales promo-
tion that falsely claims comparable virtues for its product in its ads should not immunize 
the seller from rigorous government regulation of the ad to prevent that falsity. 
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2. Other Matters of Societal Import 
 The “public discourse”182 or expression on matters of “general 
public interest”183 that the First Amendment protects includes not only 
speech that relates to self-government and matters of public policy that 
should (or should not) be acted upon by the government.184 The 
speech that helps to form society’s views of itself,185 and indeed to gen-
erate its culture,186 may be, and often is, remote from matters of self-
government.187 
                                                                                                                      
 
182 Post, supra note 101, at 119–78, 164–67; Post, supra note 106, at 604; Post, supra 
note 15, at 11–12; Post, supra note 24, at 2367–69; Post, supra note 3, at 1253–55, 1275–77. 
183 Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 754, 764; see Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 
(1993). The Court refers ambiguously to the “societal interests in broad access to complete 
and accurate commercial information.” Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 766 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas, 
447 U.S. at 561–62); see Bates, 433 U.S. at 377–78; Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 762–
65. 
184 Post, supra note 15, at 11 (explaining the doctrine that commercial advertising fa-
cilitates a free flow of information that “is highly relevant to the formation of democratic 
public opinion”). 
185 See Bollinger, supra note 27, at 12–42. 
186 As Professor Joseph Raz explains, such “acts of expression . . . fulfill important func-
tions in contemporary societies.” Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 303, 311 (1991). Moreover, according to Professor Raz: 
—They serve to familiarize the public at large with ways of life common in 
certain segments of the public. 
—They serve to reassure those whose ways of life are being portrayed that 
they are not alone, that their problems are common problems, their experi-
ences known to others. 
—Finally, they serve as validation of the relevant ways of life. They give them 
the stamp of public acceptability. 
Id. 
187 It is said that this type of speech helps create opposing views of the “collective iden-
tity,” which is “highly significant for the general orientation of the nation,” even though it 
“may not have immediate policy implications.” Post, supra note 15, at 11. Tracing back to 
the grand notion of the pursuit of truth and evolving into the discourse of the marketplace 
of ideas, such speech may fairly claim First Amendment protection—to support “low” cul-
ture, like portrayals of, or references to, transient fashion styles or many forms of enter-
tainment, as well as “high” culture. See Balkin, supra note 69, at 35–36 (“[T]he realm of 
culture, for purposes of the free speech principle . . . . refers to a set of historically contin-
gent and historically produced social practices and media that human beings employ to 
exchange ideas and share opinions.”); Cole, supra note 62, at 892–94; Raz, supra note 186, 
at 321–23. The First Amendment is concerned with protecting not only speech about pub-
lic issues, “but also speech that concerns popular expression in art as well as other cultural 
concerns such as gossip, mores, fashions and popular music.” Balkin, supra note 69, at 41. 
The truth thus pursued is not simply the satisfaction or insight that the individual 
seeks in her search for some objective truth to enrich her understanding of life or her 
capacity to enjoy it. Its pursuit furthers the development of communal information, values, 
and culture. See David O. Brink, Mill’s Liberal Principles and Freedom of Expression 1, 12–16 
(Univ. of San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-99, 2007). That truth is not a 
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 “Cultural” speech (that is valued for the “pursuit of truth”), like 
the truth pursued, is a kind of public good188 that may enhance the 
personal development of individuals,189 as well as enrich the society.190 
The communal benefit, whether or not connected to the process of 
self-government, follows because such expression and its content con-
stitute the sharing by its participants in the society’s way of life, atti-
tudes, values, and images of itself; the content of the expression is not 
simply possessed or owned by individuals for themselves.191 The root of 
First Amendment protection in the communal aspects of truth-seeking 
is not severed by the rhetoric of “competition of the market,” with its 
                                                                                                                      
verity; rather, it is constantly evolving, never captured. See Post, supra note 25, at 1120–23 
(arguing that the true collective identity should always be considered open ended). 
Others have advanced the notion that truth is a process as well as a (transient) prod-
uct, See Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on 
the First Amendment § 2.02 (1994); see also G.E. Lessing, A Rejoinder, in Philosophical 
and Theological Writings 95, 98 (H.B. Nisbet ed. & trans., 2005) (“If God were to hold 
in his right hand all the truth and in his left the unique ever-active spur for truth, although 
with the corollary to err forever, asking me to choose, I would humbly take his left and say: 
Father give! for the pure truth is for you alone!”); Cole, supra note 62, at 877 & nn. 78–80 
(citing John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, reprinted in The Tradition 
of Freedom 285 (Milton Mayer ed., 1957) (1690)). The pursuit of it is a process rooted in 
openness to expression of new information and ideas that are assumed to enrich the life of 
the society. The process helps to generate the tolerance that produces communal accom-
modation of varied, and sometimes conflicting, inputs (e.g., opinions, information, ideas, 
and values) by individuals. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). It was 
John Stuart Mill who articulated the notion that the pursuit of truth requires freedom of 
speech. Mill, supra note 30, at 15–52; see Cole, supra note 62, at 877--78. 
188 As used here, the term “public good” refers to the nonpossessory quality of such 
good, a somewhat different affect than Professor Raz offers when he refers to the “public 
good” character of the speech to be protected. See Raz, supra note 104, at 134. 
189 Notwithstanding cultural speech’s presumed underproduction when viewed in 
terms of a world of rational wealth-maximizing individuals, the resulting notion that it 
should not be regulated is less acceptable for commercial speech. See Daniel A. Farber, Free 
Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 563–
571 (1991); Posner, supra note 71, at 24–29, 39–40. 
190 Mill points out: 
Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner, if to be 
obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury it would make 
some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on 
many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is 
robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation . . . . 
Mill, supra note 30, at 16. That the speech may bring pleasure to speakers but pain to 
listeners does not alter its value as a contribution to society, even though it may call for 
ameliorating intervention by government. 
191 See Balkin, supra note 69, at 39–40. Even if not every consumer buys the product, 
the ad is imitated by individuals and absorbed by society through a passive acceptance that 
impacts society just as greatly as if every consumer had bought the product. 
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laissez-faire predicate of possessive individualism,192 a rhetoric that over 
time was transformed in its imagery (and its meaning) to the market-
place of ideas. 
 The range of expression on matters of general public interest, in-
cluding matters of cultural interest that may be covered by the First 
Amendment, is substantially broader, and its content is significantly 
more varied and less cabinable, than that of speech covered by the First 
Amendment as expression on matters of self-government or public pol-
icy.193 Such expression in enriched commercial speech,194 if uttered 
                                                                                                                      
 
192 See Mill, supra note 30, at 15–52 (discussing the role of conflicts among ideas in 
enriching individuals); Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 90–96 (analyzing the relationship of 
dissenting political voices, individualism, and truth); Balkin, supra note 69, at 33–38; see 
also Cole, supra note 62, at 893–96 (arguing that a misreading of early case law led to the 
doctrine that justified government intervention to protect the rights of listeners); cf. Fiss, 
supra note 33, at 1405–08 (offering an illuminating history of the notion of pursuit of 
“Truth,” and its transformation in the First Amendment). 
193 The proposal of terms of sale or colorless description of products is said to consti-
tute information that may possibly be of public interest, or that may stimulate discussion or 
simply consideration of matters of “significant societal interest.” See Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; 
Post, supra note 15, at 46–50. But narrow commercial speech does not invite, or even sug-
gest, consideration of such matters. It functions, as Professor Daniel Farber and others 
have suggested, simply as a component of a potentially regulable transaction involving two 
or more parties. See supra note 188–190 and accompanying text. As with narrow commer-
cial speech of “possible” political interest, there is little chance that its mere exposure to 
the listener will stimulate interest in, or discussion of, the matters of “significant societal 
interest” that implicate the First Amendment. See Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 761 
(“Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical or 
political . . . [or] to report on any newsworthy factor to make any generalized observations 
about commercial matters.”). It is possible that offers of some services—such as counsel to 
a person charged criminally—may be speech that is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion because of what the speaker offers. Cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 429–32, 438–39 
(1978) (holding that solicitation of prospective clients by a nonprofit organization that 
utilized litigation as a vehicle for social change warranted First Amendment protection). 
194 Scholars have examined the number and content of such offers. See, e.g., Collins & 
Skover, supra note 139, at 698, 738–39; Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 639–42; Lin, 
supra note 46, at 462–66. Similar effects are claimed for the expression embodied in prod-
uct placement efforts in television shows, movies, or theatrical performances. See Stern, 
supra note 3, at 126. Illustrative of sales efforts for which such entitlement is suggested are 
the ubiquitous, more or less “still” visions of lifestyles—in matters of food, dress, cars, cos-
metics, or aromas, or even medical attention—and pleasures or gratifications that are said 
to accompany the acquisition and use of the products or services they offer. Similarly, 
many enriched commercial communications (both print and electronic) offer stories, 
dramas, or music, or portray scenes of satisfaction, pleasure or even romance, that are 
suggested to accompany, or result from, use of the advertised product or service. See, e.g., 
Daniel Callender, Attorney Advertising and the Use of Dramatization in Television Advertisements, 
9 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 89, 103–04 (2001); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 635. 
Advertisers portray those lifestyles and appealing imagery for living to induce indi-
viduals to purchase the products or services they offer. But the communications create or 
emphasize (and occasionally alter) visions of living that may infuse the society, and may 
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separately, often might be entitled to First Amendment coverage as part 
of public expression affecting the appearance and values of our society, 
and changes in each; and occasionally its role, as such, in the commer-
cial communication may dominate the presentation, and justify so 
treating the entire communication.195 Moreover, ads for sale of prod-
ucts can, and occasionally do, serve an entertainment or stimulating 
value for the individual consumer that entails sharing in the society’s 
culture,196 or socializing individuals, by solidifying or generating behav-
ioral patterns and associations.197 Indeed, commercial communications 
                                                                                                                      
thus plausibly be claimed to create (or become part of) its culture—sometimes thinly, 
sometimes thickly. Thus, although these attractive portrayals and their imagery may be 
absorbing to individuals, the question is whether their role (which is to be noted and pas-
sively accepted or enjoyed to induce purchase of a product) entails speech that engages 
the societal interests with which the First Amendment is concerned. One must bear in 
mind that the First Amendment protects low culture as well as high culture, ranging from 
the Marlboro Man to Rembrandt, from Warhol to sales jingles, and from antique furniture 
and clothing to contemporary ads for furniture and fashionable clothing. “People use raw 
material of mass culture to articulate and express their values.” Jack M. Balkin, Populism 
and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 Yale L.J. 1935, 1948–49 (1995). As has 
been noted, “[t]hose visions . . . are highly significant for the general orientation of the 
nation. Visions of the good life articulated within commercial ads are relevant to this proc-
ess.” Post, supra note 15, at 11. 
195 Expression and imagery in many, if not most, print or television ads would not be 
proffered by the speaker in its own interest except as part of the sales effort, and therefore 
can be argued to be inseparable. For example, an ad could claim that Magic Johnson en-
joys riding in “brand name” autos or using “these” sneakers. A similar analysis would follow 
for ads for “dolphin-safe” tuna or (RED) ads, and even for photographs of clothes or jew-
elry on models, thought by the sellers to be attractive to viewers. See Ron Nixon, Bottom 
Line for (Red), N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2008, at C1; see also Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 163 (denying 
First Amendment protection to claims by the egg industry regarding the nutritional in-
formation of eggs); In re R.J. Reynolds, 113 F.T.C. at 344–49 (denying First Amendment 
protection for misleading and false studies published by tobacco company regarding the 
health effects of smoking cigarettes); Geyh, supra note 3, at 56 n.172 (arguing that protect-
ing corporate speech could lead to false corporate speech being granted more protection 
than false commercial speech); Holt, supra note 97, at 623–33 (discussing the advertising 
campaign of an insurance company that denounced large jury verdicts). 
196 Balkin, supra note 69, at 38–50. Imagery or suggestion through pictorial portrayal 
or verbal beguilement may enrich an individuals’ understanding or perception of the 
world and possibly of his place in it—and affect his views about the societal import of the 
matters or ideas portrayed. That process is the basis for claiming First Amendment protec-
tion of such speech—not so much to enhance an individual’s growth but for its effect on 
the society and on his role as a member of society. See Post, supra note 15, at 11. 
197 See Lawrence O. Gostin & Gail H. Javitt, Health Promotion and the First Amendment: 
Government Control of the Informational Environment, 79 Milbank Q. 547, 554–55 (2001); 
Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: A Population-Based Ap-
proach to the First Amendment, 39 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 363, 380–85 (2006). Advertising is as of-
ten, if not more often, persuasive as informational. Whether or not its effect is to persuade 
a consumer to purchase a commodity, it may also be to persuade a consumer about mat-
ters of cultural import. See McGowan, supra note 3, at 420–29. 
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on television often take on affects similar to those of the dramas shown 
on the programs that their commercial sponsors are subsidizing.198 It is 
argued in support of First Amendment coverage of those enriched 
commercial communications that the same sorts of considerations that 
justify First Amendment coverage of the dramas or artistic or musical 
works that the commercial speaker sponsors also justify First Amend-
ment coverage of the entire commercial communications—as contribu-
tions to matters of pervasive societal interest and to the satisfaction or 
development of shared interests by the individual listeners or viewers.199 
 Against such claims is the basic posture of commercial speech or 
“the social practice” in which it is embedded.200 The transactional ef-
fort focuses the listeners’ attention on purchasing or declining to pur-
chase the proffered goods.201 That practice, in which the entire com-
munication is thus embedded, makes its noncommercial import criti-
cally different than would be the import of a freestanding 
noncommercial presentation of the same, or similar, material—both 
for the speaker and for the listener.202 Commercial portrayals (includ-
ing the noncommercial components203) are offered to convey an un-
challengeable message or image that focuses on inducing the listener’s 
acceptance of the proposed transaction.204 Noncommercial portrayals 
                                                                                                                      
 
198 Their content offers imagery and dialogue that could also appear in the associated 
dramas (or purportedly non-commercial, more or less artistic presentations) and offer 
comparable pleasures or satisfaction (and sometimes enlightenment) to their viewers. 
199 This argument claims protection for the ads as public expression—not merely for 
their function in selling the associated First Amendment-protected television drama. 
200 Post, supra note 15, at 15–18. 
201 See Lowenstein, supra note 136, at 1225--27. This is true notwithstanding that the 
television sponsor’s sales purposes also affect the content of the drama or artistic presenta-
tion it sponsors, which the First Amendment protects. 
202 The “social practice in which commercial speech is embedded” generally involves 
communication of “information” or efforts to persuade. Post, supra note 15, at 18. But not 
all such communication entails the speech that the First Amendment protects. Professor 
Post suggests that such communication properly claims First Amendment protection be-
cause it conveys information of relevance to the “voting of wise decisions,” or more gener-
ally “to democratic decision making.” Id. at 15, 49. But this analysis moves the inquiry to 
(1) delineating the criteria by which to determine if the communicated information suffi-
ciently connects the speaker or listener to his role as a participating member of the society 
and (2) to applying those criteria in concrete cases. If commercial speech is viewed as the 
utterance of expression in order to induce listeners to buy the product, and if its societal 
import is designed for (and is subordinated to) that purpose, its social practice does not 
often implicate First Amendment protection. 
203 Ready acceptance of the noncommercial expression is the aspiration of the seller, 
who is not benefitted by such expression if it interests the audience but dilutes the persua-
siveness of the sales message. 
204 If offered in a nontransactional context, content might be drawn more broadly be-
cause it lacks the limiting purpose of inducing a consumer, concerned only with herself, to 
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of the same subject matter could, and often would, offer a different 
presentation to the audience and suggest a more complex or chal-
lengeable meaning for the same material. The noncommercial expres-
sion, if standing alone, might well have a significantly thicker connec-
tion to emerging societal values and behavior, and a more stimulating 
impact on discussion and appreciation of its societal relevance by indi-
viduals than it does when part of a commercial proposal.205 
 As a nontransactional presentation, the communication would be 
subject to outside comment and possibly to challenge by other speakers 
on its import or credibility206—a setting that is rarely, if ever, encoun-
                                                                                                                      
 
make a purchase. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–49 (1983); Raz, supra note 104, 
at 146--49; Shiner, supra note 61, at 308–10; Post, supra note 15, at 20–25; see also City of 
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (highlighting that government employees have 
the right to speak on matters concerning government policies without a fear of retalia-
tion); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (explaining that teachers may 
not be constitutionally compelled to relinquish their First Amendment rights to discuss the 
operation of schools in which they work). Indeed, the emphasis on the listener as the par-
ticipant for whom the First Amendment is said to protect commercial speech underscores 
that passivity. 
205 For example, using the story of the 1942 Supreme Court case, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
Chrestensen’s ads and submarine tour would not likely be conducted in the same way by a 
U.S. naval authority offering tours to civilians. See 316 U.S. 52–53 (1942), overruled by Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748. Similarly, commercial advocacy of the use of sneakers or 
cuffed shirts as better modes of living than the use of shoes or uncuffed shirts is likely to dif-
fer from expository expression in speech that does not urge purchase of the products or 
imply that the consumer will become a better athlete or a more successful broker or lothario. 
But see Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting First 
Amendment protection from a regulation requiring disclosures of contents of milk for which 
no potential harm was envisioned, merely to inform consumers of harmless additives). See 
supra notes 134–150 and accompanying text (discussing paternalism). If the regulation is 
found to be aimed more to avert harm from use of the offered product than to deceive in its 
offer, other First Amendment considerations may be involved. Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504–07 (1996) (holding that a state ban on advertising liquor 
prices was not designed to protect against misleading information and did not effectively 
advance the state’s interest in promoting temperance, and therefore it did not survive First 
Amendment scrutiny); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 431–35 (1993) (hold-
ing that a federal law prohibiting lottery advertising by radio stations located in states without 
lotteries did not violate the First Amendment because it promoted North Carolina’s anti-
gambling policy without greatly affecting the lotteries in other states); In re R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 1988 WL 490114, at *3–6 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 1988) (allowing a tobacco company to 
advertise a study questioning the health risks associated with smoking cigarettes because this 
was not ultimately designed to sell cigarettes). 
206 See Jordan Kline, Metro Food Fight, in Devil in the Details, Am. Prospect (Aug. 14, 2005), 
http://prospect.org/article/devil-details-88 (illustrating the competing ads between pro-
vegan political groups and major meat and dairy producers in the Washington, D.C. public 
transit system); see also Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282, 283 (6th Cir. 1941) (enforcing a 
Federal Trade Commission order directing a distributor of stainless steel cooking utensils to 
stop misleading advertising regarding the health effects of aluminum). That the commercial 
communication appeals more to the listeners’ emotions than to their deliberative capacity is 
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tered by sales communication.207 The societally interesting component 
of the commercial presentation is part of a heavily financed commer-
cial effort, and it is rarely questioned or challenged by comparably well-
financed commercial speech (or other speech).208 Such commercial 
speech offers less a process by which individuals examine, or the com-
munity chooses, communal lifestyles, tastes, values, or ideas than a 
process for individuals’ acquisition of the commodities or services of-
fered, and for more or less passively imitating the imagined mode of 
living. These lifestyles and values are framed by their sales purpose 
(rather than by any independent expressive or cultural concern).209 
Speech offered to induce, and in fact inducing, such passive acceptance 
is unlikely to stimulate the dialogic communication that serves the “sig-
nificant societal interests” that the First Amendment protects. 
 Nevertheless, despite the coloring effect of its encasement in sales 
efforts on the content and appreciation of the cultural component of 
commercial speech, such a communication may, on occasion, implicate 
sufficient addressee attention to matters of societal interest, and suffi-
ciently affect societal attitudes and values, to be plausibly assimilable to 
otherwise First Amendment protected cultural speech210— notwith-
                                                                                                                      
 
not a significantly different vulnerability in the case of commercial speech than in the case of 
noncommercial, protected speech. 
207 See supra notes 155–167 and accompanying text (discussing narrow commercial 
speech). This is apart from the intended subliminal impact of the ads. See Collins & Skover, 
supra note 139, at 703–07; Moon, supra note 90, at 109–12. This is also apart from the lack 
of “rational” persuasiveness in much commercial speech. See Shiner, supra note 61, at 308–
09 (discussing “Lifestyle advertising and the Public Good”); Strauss, supra note 49, at 365–
68 (discussing “ill–considered” action); see also Haan, supra note 100, at 1282–84 (arguing 
that changes in legal persuasion have mirrored changes in commercial persuasion, and 
both have begun to emphasize “nonrational factors . . . such as emotion and impulse”). 
The different treatment of transactional and nontransactional speech does not rest on the 
differences between informational speech and noninformational speech and their differ-
ent impacts on decision making. See Lowenstein, supra note 136, at 1225–37. 
208 See Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 841–51 (explaining the connection between implied 
associations and First Amendment protection). The practices of “non-challenge” may be 
changing, as some recent developments suggest. See Elliott, supra note 43 (detailing the 
comparative advertising that Sears used for its riding mower as well as the recent compara-
tive ads used by other companies). 
209 Any communal ambience that such speech may generate is more in individuals pas-
sively noting the lifestyles portrayed in the communications attached to the products of-
fered, rather than in the discussion or consideration of the import of those lifestyles that is 
the concern of the pursuit of truth. It is meant to be consumed or digested in order to 
help induce a purchase. It is rarely meant to provoke a responsive act or thought about the 
societal interests that may be implicit in the ad. 
210 The lifestyles and related matters of appearance illustrated in commercial ads (both 
in print and on television) are more likely to be absorbed into the communal culture than 
public policy discourse in commercial speech is likely to engage listeners or viewers. Cf. Emily 
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standing the expected and likely passivity of its acceptance by the ad-
dressees211 and doubts about whether such non-dialogic communica-
tion is entitled to First Amendment coverage. 
C. Linking Commercial Speech to Speech Covered by the First Amendment 
 The steep sales tilt of the commercial communication, coupled 
with the likely absence of any responsive discourse on such matters of 
societal import as it may contain, deprives the communication of the 
communal cast or the dialogic212 potential of the kind of speech that 
the First Amendment covers. This is no less true for commercial speech 
claiming First Amendment protection because of its cultural references 
as because of its self-government or public policy references. The cul-
tural components of many commercial communications, particularly 
the portrayals of lifestyles and attitudes that are expected to result from 
the purchase, often produce societally adopted lifestyles and inform the 
society’s values and attitudes. To be sure, similar portrayals made in a 
                                                                                                                      
Badger, Assessing Cigarettes’ Right to Free Speech, Pac. Standard (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www. 
psmag.com/legal-affairs/assessing-cigarettes-right-to-free-speech-35711 (comparing old ciga-
rette ads, such as Joe Camel cartoon images, with the graphic images of rotting lungs and 
teeth that the U.S. Department of Agriculture attempted to compel cigarettes to put on 
their packaging). Such lifestyle allusions, pictorial as well as verbal, are designed to be 
more attractive and commanding to the viewer and are likely to function more powerfully 
than public policy allusions in influencing the sale. Expression thus engaging cultural 
considerations is likely to be more frequently injected in enriched commercial speech than 
is expression relating to matters of self-government or public policy, and less likely to be as 
effectively expressable separately from its commercial affiliation than is the latter. Ads that 
portray Magic Johnson as enjoying particular sneakers, or Tiger Woods wearing a particu-
lar brand of wrist watch, or other similarly public persons enjoying automobiles, clothes, or 
food are not likely to be matched by similar ads of political ideas or figures. It may be 
noted, however, that attachment to a cultural component is not necessary for sales efforts. 
Moreover, the criteria for determining whether any particular instance of commercial 
speech sufficiently implicates the First Amendment to justify coverage are generally more 
difficult to determine and apply in the case of speech on matters of cultural interest than 
of speech on matters of self-government or public policy. It is expression of the former 
kind that presents the most (if indeed not the only) serious problem in determining 
whether and how the First Amendment should protect commercial speech. 
211 Not only is the desirability of the advertised lifestyle rarely questioned, but the 
achievability (or unachievability) by any consumer of it or its promise is not discussed any 
more frequently. 
212 See Post, supra note 15, at 12 (arguing that commercial speech is an unlikely candi-
date for First Amendment protection under a participatory model of free speech protec-
tion because commercial speech does not typically create a reciprocal dialogue). The dia-
logic aspect may be growing. See, e.g., Clifford, supra note 178 (detailing politically themed 
ads from I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter and Svedka vodka); Nixon, supra note 195 (ex-
plaining how companies contribute to the “(RED) Campaign” to fund HIV and AIDS re-
search and in turn collect goodwill from consumers). 
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noncommercial context might similarly affect absorption of their con-
tent into the social fabric and effectively turn their presentations into 
cultural references that the First Amendment protects. 
 The question is whether inclusion of references to such matters of 
cultural import (or of public policy or self-government) in the speech 
containing the sales communication213 permits or requires First 
Amendment coverage of regulation of any or all of the commercial 
communication.214 The answer turns on whether the expression rea-
sonably could be, or would be, understood by its addressees and audi-
ence as simply a part of a sales pitch—an undisputable or readily ac-
ceptable proposition whose presentation merely enhances the desirabil-
ity (non-utilitarian) of purchasing the proffered product or service215— 
or would (or reasonably could) be read (or heard) by its audience to 
stimulate consideration of the substance of the expression’s noncom-
mercial reference.216 In the former case, there is no reason to invoke 
the First Amendment’s restraining power over government regulation 
because the expression is little more than a part of the transaction;217 
and, often there is good reason not to do so. In the latter case, First 
Amendment considerations become relevant—both in interpreting the 
commercial expression and the regulation, and in assessing the regula-
tion’s constitutionality. In any case, consideration of the fact of the 
speaker’s choosing the context, as well as the content, of the expression 
is required.218 
                                                                                                                      
213 A sales communication is a communication which itself would otherwise have no enti-
tlement to First Amendment protection if it did not include those references, because its only 
basis for such protection would be the inadequate autonomy claims of speakers and listeners. 
214 Another way of asking this question is whether attachment of the sales message to 
otherwise protectable speech deprives that speech of First Amendment protection. 
215 An example of expression that could enhance the desirability of a product would 
be the imprint of the American flag or “Made in the U.S.A.” in the ad or on the packaging. 
Consider another example: in the case of a now defunct, but then popular, brand of ciga-
rettes (in the 1930s and 1940s), the seller changed the color of the packaging from bright 
green to white and advertised intensively and extensively the formula “Lucky Strike Green 
Has Gone to War.” Consider also the contemporary explosion of “greening” ads. 
216 This would be the case if the audience pondered such questions as: is it good or 
bad for the product to be “Made in the U.S.A.”? Or, is the claim true or false? Should 
Lucky Strike’s sacrifice stimulate others to make similar moves, or at least does it stimulate 
discussions about such responses? Do the “greening” ads stimulate reader interest in eco-
logical questions? 
217 Doctrinally, the expression is to be regarded as simply part of the transaction, and 
therefore it is not speech—or it is speech that is not covered by the First Amendment. See 
supra notes 57–82 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship between commer-
cial speech and commercial transactions). 
218 That is, in order to justify what is effectively a presumption that commercial speech 
should not be covered by the First Amendment, courts must consider these two factors. 
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 The content and the context of commercial speech are chosen by 
the seller, whose only purpose for including references to matters of 
societal import is to enhance the likelihood of the proposed sale.219 
The speaker’s choice of a product-selling message, rather than a free-
standing noncommercial communication, as the vehicle for making a 
policy pronouncement or a cultural expression suggests his (or her, or 
its) expectation that those components of the message will be under-
stood as part of the sales process and in furtherance of the sale rather 
than as stimuli to interest the potential consumer (or others) in the 
substantive import of those pronouncements.220 That intended under-
standing is emphasized by the effort and expense generally invested in 
the presentation of the material so as to glamorize the reference and 
make it not only an undisputable proposition, but also one that sup-
ports, and indeed invites, the purchase. Although not every instance of 
such speech may be so cast, the structure and presentation of the ex-
pression on matters of public policy or cultural import in commercial 
communications suggest principally (if not indeed solely) its transac-
tion-stimulating purport, and the personal (i.e., possessive) benefits to 
the parties from consummating the transaction. Hence, those who 
claim that any particular such communication is covered by the First 
Amendment, and therefore not regulable because of the inclusion of 
the otherwise covered expression and the likelihood of such expression 
stimulating consideration of the related matters of societal interest, 
should bear the burden of so demonstrating. In short, the function of 
commercial speech invites the presumption that any particular instan-
tiation of such expression should be treated as “only” commercial 
speech—meaning that it is not entitled to the special protection against 
                                                                                                                      
219 The seller is not likely to be interested in persuading the audience to support, or 
even to consider, the substance of the referenced statements. The references to matters of 
societal import are intended to be understood by the addressee as undisputable proposi-
tions whose only function is to help (emotionally or psychologically) to induce purchase of 
the proffered product. They are inevitably presented in a form, and with a content, that 
the seller believes will so function, and will not be doubted or questioned by the consum-
ers whom the seller expects to attract. And as we have seen, there is little likelihood of such 
challenge, or even responsive discussion, by competitors or third persons, let alone by 
potential consumers. See supra notes 182–211 and accompanying text. Indeed, listener (or 
reader) attention to, or interest in, that substance may well disserve the sales objective of 
the communication both by diluting attention and by stimulating diversionary interests. 
220 That the expression would engage First Amendment protection if standing alone 
may not be enough if the sales message dominates the audience’s attention so as to trivial-
ize or effectively subordinate the allusion to public policy matters. Insofar as such material 
refers to electoral matters or other matters of public policy, it is generally designed (and is 
uttered) to induce the purchases, not at all to stimulate debate or discussion of, or action 
on, the substance of the material’s content. 
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regulation offered by the First Amendment because it is serving only 
the personal interest of individual buyers and sellers. 
 To impose that burden, which, to be sure, is not easily carried,221 is 
not likely to result in any deprivation to the speaker, or loss to members 
of the audience individually (or to society collectively) of any expres-
sion that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment.222 If 
the commercial communication can plausibly be read to induce or in-
vite the addressee to consider the substance of the incorporated ex-
pression on matters of societal import, that expression or its substance 
is highly likely to be utterable by the speaker separately from the com-
mercial communication, without loss of meaning or appeal. Certainly if 
the allegedly covered expression, as it appears in commercial speech, is 
expressible without the sales message, there is no loss of expression 
which the First Amendment should protect, because such expression 
can be uttered, often equally or more effectively, without being in-
cluded with the sales message.223 Nothing in the First Amendment or 
                                                                                                                      
 
221 There is considerable judicial discretion in deciding the question. For example, is the 
public policy expression so articulated, and so situated in the larger communication, as to 
induce the attention or interest of the audience? If so, will its appeal induce enough consid-
eration to penetrate its encasement in the sales communication? The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2003 decision in 2003, in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky is the classic case. 539 U.S. 654, 653–65 (2003) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). Some of Nike’s communications may actually have been “commer-
cial speech,” but because of their content and context Nike may well have overcome the pre-
sumption and carried the burden of demonstrating that they were not simply commercial 
speech. See id. The ambiguity problem is not unlike the problems generated by many other 
instances of First Amendment coverage, including which speech incites violence, constitutes 
“fighting words,” or is obscene. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 126, at 1464–65.. But cf. Edenfield, 
507 U.S. at 770--71 (placing the burden of persuasion on the defender of regulation of ex-
pression that has been determined to be covered commercial speech). The First Amendment 
problem here is not one for which “the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.” Cf. FEC v. 
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 474, 476–82 (2007) (holding that a prohibition on the 
use of corporate funds to finance “electioneering communications” before state primary and 
general elections violated corporate free speech rights). 
222 If the policy expression is not material, but (presumably) has independent infor-
mative import, it is highly unlikely that it is (or can be) so “inextricably intertwined” with 
non-policy matters as to be unutterable separately. In that case, there is no occasion or 
reason for First Amendment coverage of the commercial communication, since the 
speaker is well able to make the policy expression without tying it to the sales pitch. In the 
rare case of commercial speech in which (1) the public policy expression is sufficiently 
articulated and presented to suggest or even to invite consumer consideration of the pol-
icy, and (2) the noncommercial expression cannot be uttered substantially as effectively 
apart from attachment to a proposal to sell a particular seller’s product, adumbrations 
from the First Amendment may become relevant. 
223 See Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (noting that although commercial speak-
ers are entitled to the “full panoply of First Amendment protections for their direct com-
ments on public issues,” there is no reason to extend similar protection to statements 
made in the context of commercial transactions); cf. United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 
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moral theory requires expression on such public matters to be subsi-
dized by the speaker’s customers’ or by audiences’ purchase of the 
specified products or services. If a speaker wishes to allude to matters of 
public policy or other societal interest in order to facilitate the sale of 
its products or services, the First Amendment does not require the gov-
ernment effectively to enable, or protect, the speaker in causing con-
sumers to help finance such speech.224 Indeed, as this Article has 
noted,225 such expression that might otherwise be covered by the First 
Amendment is more likely to contribute to misleading, or otherwise to 
injuring, its audience or addressees if made in the context of commer-
cial speech than in the context of speech discussing only matters of 
public policy or of cultural import generally.226 
                                                                                                                      
 
549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the First Amendment does not offer protection for 
speech that is an integral part of a crime). Indeed, it is hard to envision any instance in 
which “inextricable intertwinement” with a sales message is necessary in order to illumi-
nate or enhance the import of a public policy expression (or its appeal) whose content 
could not be uttered separately, albeit more explicitly. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 473--74 (1989) (concluding that the noncommercial aspects of a Tupperware party 
sales message were neither compelled nor essential and therefore were not entitled to First 
Amendment protection); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67--68 (noting that communications can “con-
stitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of impor-
tant public issues”); see also Stern, supra note 3, at 121–23 (explaining the difficulty in clas-
sifying corporate commentary on specific political or social issues and the difficulty in 
deciding whether or not to award speech protection to such commentary); Cade, supra 
note 3, at 276–81 (arguing that there is an important distinction between statements made 
in the context of policy debates and statements regarding a specific business’s operations). 
224 If the speaker does not think it worthwhile to vent the policy expression or other 
matter of societal import in a noncommercial context, the listener is not deprived of ex-
pression that the First Amendment protects, because the listener is entitled only to such 
expression by a willing and able speaker. It is also relevant that the incentives of the gov-
ernment to misregulate are apt to be significantly weaker in the case of commercial speech 
than in the case of speech on matters of self-government (no entrenchment), public pol-
icy, or indeed on matters of general societal import (less stimulus to ignore or mute minor-
ity views). To be sure, impurities may infect legislative or executive decisions on regulating 
commercial speech, as public choice theorists tell us, but the infection from lobbies or 
trade-offs among competitors is not likely to be as potent. 
225 See supra notes 34–51 and accompanying text (discussing the institutional consid-
erations that differentiate commercial speech from speech that is protected by the First 
Amendment). The consequences of being misled or otherwise injured by speech of the 
non-commercial (e.g., political) speaker may be considerably more harmful to society than 
the comparable injuries from unlawful commercial speech. But the harms from the for-
mer are generally less likely to materialize (at least without prior response) than are the 
harms from the latter. To that extent, the societal costs of unduly restricting the latter are 
likely to be considerably less than the comparable costs of similar repression of the former. 
226 References to cultural matters (whether freestanding or in commercial speech) 
may well be less likely than expression on electoral or public policy matters to engage 
monitoring responses. But there is more likelihood of such responses to freestanding cul-
tural references than to such references as components of commercial speech—and by the 
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 In sum, quite apart from the debatable claim that the content of 
commercial speech, even if truthful, is less worthy of First Amendment 
protection than is noncommercial speech,227 interpretation of the 
commercial communication more as a sales document than as an ex-
pression of public policy, cultural, or general societal interest is invited 
by the speaker’s choice to encase the expression in a sales message.228 
Such a reading suggests that liability or culpability for the communica-
tion’s deceptiveness, or its inadequacy to alert the consumer to the not 
unlikely consequences (i.e., limited benefits and possible costs or perils) 
of use of the proffered products or services should be judged by the 
standards that the seller invited—those of commercial jurisprudence229— 
rather than by criteria derived from the First Amendment. But, they 
should be applied in a context that lacks the essential conditions on 
which First Amendment protection of speech rests.230 
                                                                                                                      
 
same token there is a much greater need for government intervention in the latter cir-
cumstance than in the former to prevent misleading the audience. It does not detract 
from this conclusion that such government intervention in commercial speech is less likely 
to be taken in the interest of entrenching or further empowering the governors (or to be 
comparably “fallible”) than is regulation of speech that is otherwise protected by First 
Amendment—notwithstanding the teaching of public choice theory. 
227 Cf. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 787--88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing the majority for embracing the unprincipled line drawing of the Court’s earlier com-
mercial speech cases). 
228 That aspiration, which alone drives the communication, does not contemplate in-
teresting the consumer in (and indeed wishes not to divert his attention to) matters of self-
government, public policy, or even of such discussable cultural import as the expression 
may have. References to such matters are intended to be understood by the consumer as 
undisputable components of a persuasive statement inserted to induce a purchase, and are 
inevitably presented in a form, and with a content, that the seller believes will help to in-
duce the sale, and will not be challenged or questioned by the consumer. 
229 Commercial jurisprudence generally permits courts to hold speakers liable or cul-
pable for speech that is “misleading,” “deceptive,” or even legitimately “disputable,” not-
withstanding the ambiguity of some of those terms—conditions for which the First 
Amendment would preclude liability. See, e.g., In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) 
(“Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment. . . . Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.”); Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is no such 
thing as a false idea. . . . But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”). 
230 See supra notes 52–82 and accompanying text (discussing traditional autonomy con-
siderations of First Amendment protection in the context of commercial speech). Because 
the function of the seller’s allusion to the matters of public policy or self-government or of 
cultural import in commercial speech is to aid the sale but rarely to persuade the listener in 
those matters, or indeed to inform him about them so as to engage his interest in them, and 
the listener is not likely to be or become interested in those matters by reason of the com-
mercial communication, there is good reason to test the speaker’s culpability by the rules of 
the playing field it chooses, whether the question is one of determining substantive liability 
or the proper judicial process. In that connection, it is important to note that the framework 
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 That the standard suggested for determining which instance of 
commercial speech containing noncommercial expression is covered 
by the First Amendment is porous does not distinguish it significantly 
from that currently invoked by the Supreme Court to determine First 
Amendment coverage.231 To be sure, the Court’s policy looks in the 
opposite direction than that currently faced by the Court. But its easier 
administrability leaves less room for the virtually unguided judicial dis-
cretion suggested in the cases dealing with that problem under the cur-
rent doctrine.232 
 It is possible that greater tolerance for regulation of commercial 
speech by denying or “loosening” the strictures of First Amendment 
coverage will have the effect of diluting First Amendment protection for 
                                                                                                                      
for concern in assessing the constitutionality of regulating commercial speech is the ade-
quacy of the expression accurately to inform the purchaser as to the price, utility, quality, or 
risk of the product or service proffered; rarely, if ever, is the problem one of the adequacy of 
the statement’s cultural or public policy import for the addressee or the society. 
Similarly, there is little reason for concern that application to commercial speech of 
the flexible notion of falsehood that commercial jurisprudence may accord in regulation 
of exchange transactions will permit government to “mutilate the thinking process of the 
community by censoring communication that the State believes might potentially be de-
ceptive.” Post, supra note 15, at 39. That suggestion scants the differences between the 
contestability of, or likelihood of challenge by others to, falsehood in a commercial com-
munication, and comparable claims of falsehood in non-commercial speech that otherwise 
is (and should be) protected by the First Amendment—a distinction that Professor Re-
becca Tushnet has noted and whose import she has cogently examined. See generally Re-
becca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in 
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 227 (2008). 
231 See Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561–66; Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 761–70. 
232 See, e.g., Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 429 (upholding speech restrictions so long as 
there is “a fit between the restriction and the government interest that is not necessarily 
perfect, but reasonable” under the “Central Hudson Test”); Fox, 492 U.S. at 478 (upholding 
speech restrictions “so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmen-
tal interest” under the Central Hudson Test (internal quotations omitted)); Cent. Hudson 
Gas, 447 U.S. at 564 (creating the Central Hudson Test for cases involving the regulation of 
truthful advertising about lawful products or services, which requires balancing how sig-
nificant the state interest is and how narrowly the restriction is drawn); see also Allan Ides 
& Christopher N. May, Constitutional Law—Individual Rights: Examples & Ex-
planations 377–82 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining the Central Hudson Test, which the court 
currently uses to analyze restrictions on commercial speech). It is worth noting a recurring 
variation in context that affects the resolution of the question of First Amendment cover-
age for the commercial communication: whether the injury from the speech that the chal-
lenged regulation seeks to avert is imminent to utterance of the speech (e.g., because of 
deception in inducing a purchase) or will be caused only over some period of time (e.g., 
from consuming or using the proffered product) so that there is time for “more speech” to 
debate or discourage the harmful acquisition proposed. To that extent, there may be less 
need for the First Amendment’s special protection. But the institutional structure of 
commercial speech substantially reduces the likelihood of more speech for that purpose. 
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noncommercial, otherwise protected speech.233 Understanding the im-
port of the difference between the context of noncommercial expres-
sion, which the First Amendment would not protect if uttered in com-
mercial speech, and the same expression to be protected if uttered as a 
freestanding statement, should significantly reduce the likelihood of 
systematic disadvantage to consumers without denying appropriate First 
Amendment coverage. Courts are perfectly able, if not always willing, to 
recognize the differences between the contexts in which the same ex-
pression appears and to find First Amendment coverage of speech ap-
propriate (indeed required) in one context, but not in the other. 
Conclusion 
 Commercial speech differs from the “speech” covered by, and spe-
cially protected under, the First Amendment. Commercial speech is 
much less likely to be challenged by, critically responded to, or cor-
rected by third parties. It is the possibility, or, indeed, the likelihood, of 
such “more speech” that is an essential premise for First Amendment 
protection of speech against government regulation. The institutional 
conditions that obstruct the availability of more speech to respond to 
commercial speech argue against special protection for the latter. 
 Quite apart from such considerations, the context and content of 
commercial speech also argue against extending the First Amendment’s 
special protection to such speech. First Amendment protection exists to 
serve the interests of the community collectively rather than of individ-
ual participants in their personal affairs. Such protection is not available 
for commercial speech that functions only to benefit its participants in-
dividually (as speakers or as addressees)—except possibly if it contains 
expression that would be entitled to First Amendment protection if it 
were uttered other than as a component of commercial speech. In that 
case, the entitlement of the commercial speech to the First Amend-
ment’s special protection depends upon whether in its commercial con-
text the expression would be understood by the normal addressee— 
listeners, viewers, or readers—to involve more than consummation of 
the commercial transaction—that is, to engage consideration of the im-
port of the expression for collective matters of the society. 
 
233 See Schauer, supra note 3, at 1194–1201. To invoke strict scrutiny for judicial review 
of regulation of commercial speech that is regulated only in order to discourage otherwise 
prohibitable (albeit not prohibited) commercial transactions may suggest a path to similar 
review of regulation of noncommercial speech designed anticipatorily to discourage other 
possibly prohibitable (but not prohibited) behavior. 
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